1001 Duration: 25.69 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
At that time, the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi, was promoting a plan that came to be known as "The Chalabi Plan" which did have -- called for a very prominent role for US air power in protecting an enclave -- an opposition enclave in Iraq. And I believe that that's sort of where this act was really going.
1002 Duration: 30.73 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
So let me just read that for you real quick, and see if you have any reactions -- the section 8. "Rule of Construction: Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States armed forces in carrying out this act." Do you see that that part of the act was ignored, and the regime changed -- [Oh no. No, not at all -- I don't think it was -- That -- ]
1003 Duration: 22.29 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
That's kind of what we call "weasel language" because it doesn't bar them from using American Armed Forces -- it doesn't -- There's no prohibition. It just says that this act shouldn't be used as an authorization. But it doesn't say, "US armed forces are going -- are prohibited from taking action in Iraq." No.
1004 Duration: 7.54 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
That's a Presidential decision that has to be, usually is approved by a Congressional -- a separate -- completely separate Congressional vote.
1005 Duration: 15.55 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
And what they -- I guess that language is intended to do, is to basically say, "This is not -- The vote on this act -- The passage of this act, does not represent a vote authorizing -- a vote by Congress authorizing the use of military force."
1006 Duration: 9.14 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
I guess the blurring of that line comes in when Ari Fleischer is saying our policy is regime change -- [But wait a minute, but you know -- ]
1007 Duration: 12.71 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
The fact is that the Clinton administration signed that bill. And that bill's policy makes it -- that bill made it the policy of the United States to change the regime in Iraq.
1009 Duration: 11.28 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
It was something that the Clinton administration signed -- Bill Clinton signed -- not Bush. And so the policy of regime change was established under the Clinton administration -- so Ari's right.
1010 Duration: 59.73 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
But it says, "The sense of Congress regarding --" It's a "sense of Congress" language. It says, "It should be the policy of the United States --" It isn't saying that it is the policy. And when I went back to read the actual floor debates, there was actually a debate over that specific issue where Ron Paul -- or Lee Hamilton is saying in defense of that -- "We should have no illusions about the bill. Let us be very clear about what the bill does and does not do. The bill states the sense of Congress, it does not change US policy." Ron Paul disagrees, and he says that, "I would like to challenge that statement that it doesn't change it, because it should be the policy." And he says, "It sounds pretty clear." And Lee Hamilton comes back to say, "I think the gentleman from Texas questioned my statement a moment ago in which I said that the bill states a sense of Congress. It does not change US policy. I believe my statement is correct for a couple of reasons. The language in the bill is only a sense of Congress. It does not say what the policy is. It says what the policy should be." [Yeah, but -- ]
1011 Duration: 26.19 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
Again, this is what I called weasel language. I mean, they're really famous for that kind of thing here in Washington. Where you know, you're looking to strike a political compromise that -- that satisfies both sides -- that both sides can interpret in the way they want to interpret it. And in this case, I believe, the Clinton administration interpreted it as US policy.
1012 Duration: 20.65 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
Okay. And -- Can you speak to Ahmed Chalabi and what the DIA had kind of -- their assessments -- or him being a fabricator? And at what point did -- [Well no -- They never assessed him as being a fabricator. No.] -- Or the Iraqi National Congress Intelligence? [Well, there was -- What they --]
1013 Duration: 44.14 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
What they determined was, first of all -- and there were actually two reviews -- There was one done by them, and there was one done by -- How would you put it? -- by the National Intelligence Council, which is -- or the "NIC" -- which is an advisory group of very prominent experts under -- that report to George Tenet. And -- My understanding is that in both cases -- both reviews -- formal, and I believe one was formal, and was sort of an informal "look" -- I don't know that they were kind of really structured -- But --
1014 Duration: 20.72 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
My understanding is that both reviews concluded that the information that was provided by these defectors was "marginal at best" -- most of it useless. And that some of these defectors were fabricators and or exaggerators -- or had been coached to say what they had said.
1015 Duration: 17.72 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
Okay. In late October, The New York Times broke the Office of Special Plans -- that this special unit -- [A day before us.] Oh Okay. So why don't you speak to that? [Well, actually -- No -- What they -- ]
1016 Duration: 28.83 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
They didn't actually break that story. What they broke was the creation of this intelligence analysis cell that was under Douglas Feith, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy -- that had gone back to look at connections between state -- states and terrorist groups. What the article didn't report, and what we did the next day -- and we were working on it at the same time -- was that --
1017 Duration: 15.32 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
Information that was being used by this unit also included stuff that was coming from the Iraqi National Congress. And that stuff that the regular intelligence agencies, like the CIA, wanted nothing to do with.
1018 Duration: 18.75 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
And that then "the product" -- as it's called -- the product -- or the report was then provided to the White House. And we now know that it was actually briefed to Secretary Rumsfeld and to CIA Director George Tenet.
1019 Duration: 27.16 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
And we also know that -- now, we didn't know it at the time -- that -- aEven Department of Defense officially disavowed what this report said -- And -- Or the material in this report -- It disavowed this material as being conclusive evidence that there was connections -- there were -- that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Ladin were working together to kill Americans.
1020 Duration: 13.15 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
Okay. So when you take a look back during the pre-war time period -- How do you assess the media's performance and what they could have done better?
1021 Duration: 7.01 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
Well, I think the media's performance generally was -- was woeful -- absolutely woeful.
1022 Duration: 13.28 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
They, for the most part, act as conveyor belts of administration information, information that we now know had some pretty major problems with it.
1023 Duration: 17.68 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
And nobody, very -- nobody outside of Knight-Ridder -- us -- and maybe, and I haven't done a review, but I think you need to talk to Michael Massing about what he found -- but I don't think anybody -- that's making -- that's a pretty broad statement. Let me just say --
1024 Duration: 11.04 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
Most of the media failed miserably in assessing the administration's justification for going to war in Iraq.
1025 Duration: 8.21 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
And -- How could they have done it differently? [Done what we did. And that is -- ]
1026 Duration: 10.64 seconds
Jonathan Landay:
"Here's the justifications. Let's examine them. Let's see what's true and what's not." They could have done it by doing their job.
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