1237 Duration: 17.58 seconds
Julian Borger:
I think the BBC and Andrew Gilligan were very unfortunate. They got the big story right, that there was pressure to "sex up the dossier". Unfortunately, the methods and some of the details were wrong, and so they were very vulnerable to attack.
1238 Duration: 15.85 seconds
Julian Borger:
BBC made a big mistake not 'fessing up to those mistakes very early on and saying, "Yeah, okay. These were some mistakes, but broadly speaking, we stick with the story. And we have a lot of evidence to prove that this evidence is being hyped-up."
1239 Duration: 16.05 seconds
Julian Borger:
And that -- Turning it into a show of strength between -- or a battle of strength between the BBC and the government -- was a mistake, because the BBC was vulnerable on the details. In the big picture, it was actually -- it turned out to be right.
1240 Duration: 15.12 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
And so from your sense -- I think a lot of the American press is trying to pin all of the blame on the Central Intelligence Agency -- What is your take? Do you see that it was just the CIA -- bad intelligence -- or does that make sense?
1241 Duration: 6.91 seconds
Julian Borger:
Obviously, it wasn't just the CIA. I don't necessarily believe that that's the way the American press is portraying it.
1242 Duration: 18.35 seconds
Julian Borger:
I think there is an awareness in the reporting that you see among the American press, that there was a very deliberate avoidance of dealing with the Administration. And it was being -- The whole consideration of the Administration's role was put off until a phase two -- sometime in the future. So there was an awareness that not all the story has been told.
1244 Duration: 19.42 seconds
Julian Borger:
It's quite clear that there was an environment in which CIA analysts believed that certain sorts of reports would be well received, and would be good for their career. And certain other reports would be sent back, questioned, and wouldn't be good for their career.
1245 Duration: 22.22 seconds
Julian Borger:
And there has been a reluctance by the investigations on both sides of the Atlantic to look into the role of that mechanism, because it is a political mechanism -- No one asked anyone specifically to lie, as far as anyone knows, it was just an atmosphere and an environment -- but it was, nevertheless, very real.
1246 Duration: 15.18 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
And do you also -- Did you do some -- You did some reporting on Office of Special Plans, right? [Yes] And what did you see was the influence of this alternative intelligence unit?
1247 Duration: 7.54 seconds
Julian Borger:
The role of the Office of Special Plans -- and before that, the intelligence cell within Doug Feith's office -- came up early on.
1248 Duration: 26.76 seconds
Julian Borger:
It came up in 2002, because CIA officials were getting really annoyed that there was this parallel route for intelligence to pass through to get to the White House. There was a great deal of annoyance, and there was a great deal of frustration that the analysts were coming under pressure. And there was such a buildup of annoyance that it was coming out -- people were talking about it.
1249 Duration: 18.05 seconds
Julian Borger:
And again, the people on the fringes of the intelligence world -- the former officials who were still in touch with their colleagues -- were raising the alarm about this. And all this was out there in 2002 -- very much real, on the radar.
1250 Duration: 12.11 seconds
Julian Borger:
And that is a remarkable thing -- that there was so little reporting of it in the US press -- because it was definitely out there. Knight-Ridder and New Yorker -- again, the exceptions to the rule.
1251 Duration: 21.19 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
And do you see editorially that the
New York Times -- Do you see a pattern that they were playing the sensational claims on the front page and them burying them, and then, -- As it was even -- running up to the war? You know, in hindsight, you can see that, but -- What was your perspective during the buildup when you were reading the
New York Times or the
Washington Post ?
1252 Duration: 19.39 seconds
Julian Borger:
I think the patterns become clear afterwards. I mean, it would be very easy to say, "Yes, I saw a pattern all the way along. Information was being manipulated." But it just shows how insidious it is that these -- certain reports are put on the outside, others on the inside. And that --
1253 Duration: 21.19 seconds
Julian Borger:
When you look back on it by looking at databases, it looks like they've been given almost equal weight. But in fact, some were being projected and some were being buried -- and it had a very insidious effect on public opinion, and on sort of the conventional wisdom inside the Beltway.
1254 Duration: 40.64 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
One question I've been asking a lot of people is -- From this point on, do you have a vision of what it's going to take for world peace? Do you have a vision of where we're at now, and what needs to happen, from both within this government and all governments around the world -- to kind of get to where it's a little bit more rational with our relations with each other?
1255 Duration: 20.22 seconds
Julian Borger:
I suppose what it takes is an awareness of interconnectedness on the part of populations. A sense that -- In the modern world, all countries are interconnected, interdependent -- and cannot act unilaterally without severe repercussions down the road.
1256 Duration: 12.38 seconds
Julian Borger:
And I think it is dangerous -- that there is a significant part of the American population that believes that America can do what it likes.
1257 Duration: 14.55 seconds
Julian Borger:
And because they inherently see America as a good country and they see themselves as good people, that ultimately the rest of the world will fall into line and recognize that. And I think that's a dangerous thing.
1258 Duration: 17.15 seconds
Julian Borger:
And I think only when an awareness grows up that there are repercussions for acting unilaterally -- and acting solely in short-term national interest -- then you can begin to see a political shift.
1259 Duration: 20.52 seconds
Echo Chamber Project:
And did you see that there was a clear lack of questioning of this pre-emptive policy during this critical time period? Was there a lot more questioning in the British press versus what you saw here in the United States' press? [Yes, there was very much more questioning in the British press. There was an inherent -- ] I'm sorry -- Of what? [Oh, yeah. --]
1260 Duration: 9.38 seconds
Julian Borger:
There was much more questioning about the idea of a pre-emptive military and foreign policy in the British press than the American press -- and among the British people and the American people
1261 Duration: 3.5 seconds
Julian Borger:
-- Of course, we're a small power and America is a great super-power.
1262 Duration: 18.39 seconds
Julian Borger:
And of course, America had been through 9/11, and that had an enormous difference -- It had enormous impact on the mindsets of the population, the elites, the media -- the sense that this country was suddenly vulnerable -- in a way that other countries had always been vulnerable.
-->
