Waxman's Iraq On The Record Database: Pre-War Bush Administration Statements

On March 16th, 2004 The Commitee on Government Reform published a database called "Iraq On The Record," which featured 237 pre-war and post-war statements on Iraq from the five top members of the Bush Administration. Henry Waxman requested the report, and it was introduced on the website by saying:

many doubts have been raised regarding the Administration’s assertions about the threat posed by Iraq. Prior to the war in Iraq, the President and his advisors repeatedly claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that jeopardized the security of the United States. The failure to discover these weapons after the war has led to questions about whether the President and his advisors were candid in describing Iraq’s threat.

Interestingly, this database was eventually taken offline, but it is still available here from the Internet Archive. (UPDATE: The database moved, and is actually still online here.)

I also reformated and archived all of the data into my 18,000-line timeline, and so I figured that I'd republish it here to have all of the statements in one location.

The footnotes explaining why each statement is misleading are linked at the bottom.

Date Name Type Quote Footnote
3/17/02 Cheney Chem/Bio We know they have biological and chemical weapons. 1
3/19/02 Cheney Chem/Bio We know that they have chemical weapons. 1
3/19/02 Cheney Nuclear [W]e know they are pursuing nuclear weapons. 3
3/21/02 Cheney Nuclear And [Arab nations] are as concerned as we are when they see . . . his pursuit of nuclear weapons. 3
3/24/02 Cheney Chem/Bio [T]he notion of a Saddam Hussein with his great oil wealth, with his inventory that he already has of biological and chemical weapons . . . is, I think, a frightening proposition for anybody who thinks about it. 1
3/24/02 Cheney Nuclear The issue is that he's pursuing nuclear weapons. 3
3/24/02 Cheney Nuclear This is a man of great evil, as the President said. And he is actively pursuing nuclear weapons at this time. 3
4/3/02 Powell Nuclear What we have said to our Arab friends is you may not see Saddam Hussein the same way we do, but you ought to, because those weapons of mass destruction that he is developing -- chemical, biological, nuclear -- they're more likely than not directed at one of you than us. 8
5/19/02 Cheney Chem/Bio We know he's got chemicals and biological [weapons] . . . 1
5/19/02 Cheney Nuclear [W]e know he's working on nuclear. 3
5/22/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear [M]ost of them or some of them have very aggressive programs to develop nuclear weapons; certainly Iran does, certainly Iraq does, and there are others including North Korea. 3
6/6/02 Cheney Nuclear In Afghanistan we found confirmation that bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network were seriously interested in nuclear and radiological weapons, and in biological and chemical agents. We are especially concerned about any possible linkup between terrorists and regimes that have or seek weapons of mass destruction. In the case of Saddam Hussein, we have a dictator who is clearly pursuing these deadly capabilities. 8
6/10/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio [T]hey have weaponized chemical weapons, we know that. 1
6/13/02 Powell Nuclear People should be nervous about the fact that there is a country such as Iraq with all that wealth available to it through oil, that is using that wealth to develop chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons, if they could get their hands on them, in order to threaten innocent people throughout the Persian Gulf region, and in due course perhaps even threaten us here, this far away. 8
7/19/02 Cheney Nuclear We have already found confirmation that the al-Qaeda terrorists are seriously interested in nuclear and radiological weapons, and in biological and chemical agents. At the same time, there is a danger of terror groups joining together with regimes that have or are seeking to build weapons of mass destruction. In the case of Saddam Hussein, we have a dictator who is clearly pursuing these capabilities -- and has used them, both in his war against Iran and against his own people. 8
8/7/02 Cheney Nuclear What we know now, from various sources, is that he has continued to improve the, if you can put it in those terms, the capabilities of his nuclear . . . and he continues to pursue a nuclear weapon. 3
8/26/02 Cheney Nuclear But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. 3
8/26/02 Cheney Urgent Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. 5
8/26/02 Cheney Al Qaeda As former Secretary of State Kissinger recently stated: The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action." If the United States could have preempted 9/11, we would have, no question. Should we be able to prevent another, much more devastating attack, we will, no question. This nation will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes." 32
8/29/02 Cheney Nuclear On the nuclear question, many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire such weapons fairly soon. 3
8/29/02 Cheney Nuclear [T]hey continue to pursue an aggressive nuclear weapons program. 3
9/8/02 Powell Chem/Bio There is no doubt that he has chemical weapons stocks. 1
9/8/02 Powell Chem/Bio We destroyed some after the Gulf War with the inspection regime, but there is no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical weapons stocks and he has the capacity to produce more chemical weapons. 1
9/8/02 Powell Chem/Bio QUESTION: I want to get to all that, but still a couple more questions on his capabilities. If he were able to deploy right now his chemical and biological stocks, how many people could he kill? SECRETARY POWELL: I don't know. It depends on how he deployed them, where he deployed them. Chemical weapons are different from biological weapons. And let's just recognize the fact that he has them, he has used them before, and he has killed thousands of people in their use. 1
9/8/02 Cheney Nuclear [H]e is, in fact, actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. 3
9/8/02 Cheney Nuclear But we do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon. 3
9/8/02 Cheney Nuclear QUESTION: So Saddam's more dangerous than North Korea or Iran? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: I think so because of his past practice and because we believe that he is a danger, a fundamental danger, not only for the region but potentially the United States, as well. And I say, a lot of that is based on the evidence that's now available, that he is working actively to improve his . . . nuclear weapons program. 3
9/8/02 Cheney Nuclear Now, the more recent developments have to do with our now being able to conclude, based on intelligence that's becoming available . . . that he has reconstituted his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weapon, that there are efforts under way inside Iraq to significantly expand his capability. 3
9/8/02 Powell Nuclear With respect to nuclear weapons, we are quite confident that he continues to try to pursue the technology that would allow him to develop a nuclear weapon. 3
9/8/02 Rice Nuclear We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. 3
9/8/02 Rice Nuclear We know that he has the infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon. 3
9/8/02 Cheney Al Qaeda VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: Well, I want to be very careful about how I say this. I'm not here today to make a specific allegation that Iraq was somehow responsible for 9/11. I can't say that. On the other hand, . . . new information has come to light. And we spent time looking at that relationship between Iraq, on the one hand, and the al-Qaeda organization on the other. And there has been reporting that suggests that there have been a number of contacts over the years. . . . There is -- again, I want to separate out 9/11, from the other relationships between Iraq and the al-Qaeda organization. But there is a pattern of relationships going back many years. And in terms of exchanges and in terms of people, we've had recently since the operations in Afghanistan -- we've seen al-Qaeda members operating physically in Iraq and off the territory of Iraq. . . . QUESTION: But no direct link? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: I can't -- I'll leave it right where it's at. I don't want to go beyond that. I've tried to be cautious and restrained in my comments. 4
9/8/02 Cheney Nuclear I don't want to talk about, obviously, specific intelligence sources, but it's now public that, in fact, he has been seeking to acquire, and we have been able to intercept and prevent him from acquiring through this particular channel, the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge. And the centrifuge is required to take low-grade uranium and enhance it into highly enriched uranium, which is what you have to have in order to build a bomb. 6
9/8/02 Cheney Nuclear VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: And what we've seen recently that has raised our level of concern to the current state of unrest, if you will, if I can put it in those terms, is that he now is trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs. QUESTION: Aluminum tubes. VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: Specifically aluminum tubes. 6
9/8/02 Powell Chem/Bio SECRETARY POWELL: We know that he has been working hard on developing a means to disseminate those [chemical and biological] weapons. He had artillery, he had rockets, and I'm sure he is looking at other technologies. We have evidence that he has been looking at aerial vehicles. QUESTION: Drones? SECRETARY POWELL: Drones. 41
9/8/02 Rice Nuclear We do know that there have been shipments going . . . into Iraq . . . of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to -- high-quality aluminum tools [sic] that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. 50
9/8/02 Rice Nuclear The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud. 54
9/8/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear The problem with that is the way one gains absolutely certainty as to whether a dicatator like Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons is if he uses it, and that's a little late. 60
9/12/02 Bush Urgent The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take. 5
9/12/02 Bush Nuclear Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. 6
9/12/02 Bush Nuclear Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. 10
9/12/02 Bush Al Qaeda With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors. 25
9/12/02 Bush Nuclear The first time we may be completely certain he has a --nuclear weapon is when, God forbids, he uses one. 28
9/15/02 Rice Al Qaeda MS. RICE: There is plenty to indict Saddam Hussein without a direct link to 9/11. He clearly has links to terrorism. QUESTION: All right. And links to terrorism would include al Qaeda? I just want to be certain. MS. RICE: Links to terrorism would include al Qaeda, yes. 51
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio We do know that the Iraqi regime currently has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. 1
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio His regime has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas. 1
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio But I can say obviously that they have had an enormous appetite for weapons, biological and chemical weapons. They've taken these capabilities and weaponized them. They are continuing to do so today. 1
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio And he has biological and chemical weapons. 1
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio He has, at this moment, stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. 1
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear [W]e do know they're currently pursuing nuclear weapons, that they have a proven willingness to use those weapons at their disposal. 3
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. 3
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear And he is agressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The region knows that. 3
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Al Qaeda It is the nexus between an Al-Qaeda type network and other terrorist network and a terrorist state like Saddam Hussein who has that weapons of mass destruction. As we sit here, there are senior Al-Qaeda in Iraq. They are there. 7
9/18/02 Rumsfeld Al Qaeda Well, there's no question but that Iraq has relationships with countries that are on the terrorist list. They also have relations with terrorist networks. They also have al Qaeda currently in the country, among other -- Abu Nidal just, they say, committed suicide with four or five slugs to the head; that's a hard thing to do -- but he was in Iraq. So there's no question about those relationships. 7
9/19/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio He's amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX, sarin and mustard gas. 1
9/19/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio He has stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. 1
9/19/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. 1
9/19/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear He . . . is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. 3
9/19/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear We do know that the Iraqi regime . . . they're pursuing nuclear weapons. 3
9/19/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear His regime has an active program to aquire nuclear weapons. 3
9/19/02 Rumsfeld Urgent [N]o terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people than the regime of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. 5
9/19/02 Rumsfeld Al Qaeda Iraq is part of the global war on terror. Stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war, and we can fight the various elements of the global war on terror simultaneously, as General Myers will indicate in his remarks. A principle goal in the war on terror is to prevent another September 11th or a weapons of mass destruction attack that could make September 11th seem modest by comparison, and to do it before it happens. 11
9/26/02 Bush Nuclear The regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material, could build one within a year. 10
9/26/02 Bush Chem/Bio The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. 1
9/26/02 Rumsfeld Al Qaeda Since we began after September 11th, we do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have what we consider to be very reliable reporting of senior-level contacts going back a decade, and of possible chemical- and biological-agent training. And when I say contacts, I mean between Iraq and al Qaeda. The reports of these contacts have been increasing since 1998. We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal non-aggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapon of -- weapons of mass destruction capabilities. We do have -- I believe it's one report indicating that Iraq provided unspecified training relating to chemical and/or biological matters for al Qaeda members. There is, I'm told, also some other information of varying degrees of reliability that supoprts that conclusion of their cooperation. 57
9/27/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio They have amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX and sarin and mustard gas. 1
9/27/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear Second, they question . . . what is the proof that Iraq has nuclear weapons? Where's the smoking gun? . . . But if you think about it, the last thing we should want is a smoking gun. A gun doesn't smoke until it has been fired and the goal has to be to stop such an attack before it starts. As the President told the United Nations, 'The first time we may be completely certain that a terrorist has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid,' he said, 'they use one.' 3
9/27/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. 3
9/28/02 Bush Chem/Bio The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. 1
9/28/02 Bush Al Qaeda The regime has longstanding and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are Al Qaida terrorists inside Iraq. 7
10/2/02 Bush Chem/Bio We know the designs of the Iraqi regime. In defiance of pledges to the U.N., it has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons. 1
10/2/02 Bush Urgent On its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. . . . it has developed weapons of mass death. 5
10/2/02 Bush Nuclear The regime has the scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons, and is seeking the materials needed to do so. 3
10/5/02 Bush Chem/Bio In defiance of the United Nations, Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons, and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons. 1
10/7/02 Bush Chem/Bio And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produced chemical and biological weapons. Yet Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world. 1
10/7/02 Bush Chem/Bio After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more. 1
10/7/02 Bush Chem/Bio [Iraq] possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. 1
10/7/02 Bush Nuclear The Iraqi regime . . . is seeking nuclear weapons. 3
10/7/02 Bush Nuclear Saddam Hussein . . . is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon. 3
10/7/02 Bush Nuclear Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. 6
10/7/02 Bush Nuclear If the Iraq regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than one year. 10
10/7/02 Bush Al Qaeda We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. 9
10/7/02 Bush Chem/Bio We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States. 22
10/7/02 Bush Chem/Bio In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions. 23
10/7/02 Bush Nuclear Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof - the smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. 29
10/9/02 Powell Chem/Bio We do know that he has stocks of biological weapons, chemical weapons. 1
10/14/02 Bush Al Qaeda And I also mentioned the fact that there is a connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. 7
10/22/02 Powell Chem/Bio They have chemical weapons; they have biological weapons; they're trying to acquire nuclear weapons. 1
10/22/02 Powell Nuclear [T]hey're trying to acquire nuclear weapons. 3
10/28/02 Bush Al Qaeda This [Saddam Hussein] is a person who has had contacts with al Qaeda. 7
10/30/02 Powell Urgent But the President also believes that this problem has to be dealt with, and if the United Nations won't deal with it, then the United States, with other likeminded nations, may have to deal with it. We would prefer not to go that route, but the danger is so great, with respect to Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction, and perhaps even terrorists getting hold of such weapons, that it is time for the international community to act, and if it doesn't act, the President is prepared to act with likeminded nations. 5
11/3/02 Bush Chem/Bio [Saddam Hussein is] a man who not only has chemical weapons, but he has used chemical weapons against some of his neighbors. 1
11/3/02 Bush Al Qaeda Saddam Hussein is a man who told the world he wouldn't have weapons of mass destruction, but he's got them . . . . And not only that, [he would] like nothing more than to hook up with one of these shadowy terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, provide some weapons and training to them, let them come do his dirty work, and we wouldn't be able to see his fingerprints on his action. 24
11/4/02 Bush Chem/Bio We not only know he's got chemical weapons, but incredibly enough he's used chemical weapons. 1
11/4/02 Bush Chem/Bio He said he wouldn't have chemical weapons, he's got them. 1
11/4/02 Bush Chem/Bio Not only has he got chemical weapons, but I want you to remember, he's used chemical weapons. 1
11/4/02 Bush Al Qaeda It's a man who has got connections with Al Qaida. Imagine a terrorist network with Iraq as an arsenal and as a training ground, so that a Saddam Hussein could use this shadowy group of people to attack his enemy and leave no fingerprint behind. He's a threat. 4
11/4/02 Bush Al Qaeda This is a man who has had Al Qaida connections. I want you to think about a scenario in which he becomes the arsenal and the training grounds for shadowy terrorists so that he can attack somebody who (sic) hates and not leave any fingerprints behind. He is a threat. 7
11/4/02 Bush Al Qaeda He's had contacts with Al Qaida. Imagine the scenario where an Al Qaida-type organization uses Iraq as an arsenal, a place to get weapons, a place to be trained to use the weapons. Saddam Hussein could use surrogates to come and attack people he hates. 4
11/7/02 Bush Al Qaeda He's a threat because he is dealing with Al Qaida. In my Cincinnati speech I reminded the American people, a true threat facing our country is that an Al Qaida-type network trained and armed by Saddam could attack America and leave not one fingerprint. 4
11/10/02 Powell Nuclear During the four years since inspectors have been barred from Iraq, Hussein has done everything he can to acquire and develop more weapons of mass destruction -- whether biological, chemical or nuclear. He has no scruples about using the weapons that he possesses or about providing them to terrorists should that suit his interests. 8
11/14/02 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio Well, we know that Saddam Hussein has chemical and biological weapons. 1
11/14/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear And we know that he has an active program for the development of nuclear weapons. 3
11/14/02 Rumsfeld Al Qaeda [T]here is no question but that there have been interactions between the Iraqi government, Iraqi officials, and al-Qaeda operatives. They have occurred over a span of some eight or ten years to our knowledge. There are currently al-Qaeda in Iraq. 4
11/14/02 Rumsfeld Urgent Now, transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a month, and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass destruction and transfer them, either use himself, or transfer them to the Al-Qaeda, and somehow the Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack on the United States, or an attack on U.S. forces overseas, with a weapon of mass destruction you're not talking about 300, or 3,000 people potentially being killed, but 30,000, or 100,000 . . . human beings. 62
11/20/02 Bush Urgent Today the world is also uniting to answer the unique and urgent threat posed by Iraq. A dictator who has used weapons of mass destruction on his own people must not be allowed to produce or possess those weapons. We will not permit Saddam Hussein to blackmail and/or terrorize nations which love freedom. 5
12/2/02 Cheney Al Qaeda His regime has had high-level contacts with al Qaeda going back a decade and has provided training to al Qaeda terrorists. 4
12/2/02 Cheney Al Qaeda There is also a grave danger that al Qaeda or other terrorists will join with outlaw regimes that have these weapons to attack their common enemy, the United States of America. That is why confronting the threat posed by Iraq is not a distraction from the war on terror. 35
12/3/02 Rumsfeld Nuclear QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the United States has categorically said that Iraq has an active . . . nuclear weapons program. SECRETARY RUMSFELD: Because they do. 3
12/19/02 Powell Nuclear We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear weapons program. 6
1/7/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio The problem with Iraq is chemical or biological weapons today . . . . 1
1/20/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons. 1
1/20/03 Rumsfeld Nuclear And he has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. 3
1/20/03 Rumsfeld Urgent Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. It's a danger to its neighbors, to the United States, to the Middle East and to the international peace and stability. It's a danger we cannot ignore. 5
1/20/03 Rumsfeld Urgent Iraq poses a threat to the security of our people and to the stability of the world that is distinct from any other. 5
1/20/03 Bush Nuclear The [Iraqi] report also failed to deal with issues which have arisen since 1998, including: . . . attempts to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it. 13
1/23/03 Rice Nuclear For example, the declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get uranium from abroad . . . 13
1/26/03 Powell Al Qaeda QUESTION: You referred in your speech to the links between al-Qaida and Iraq. Now, even some of our secret service chiefs say publicly there is no evidence of that. SECRETARY POWELL: We do have evidence of it. We are not suggesting that there is a 9/11 link, but we are suggesting -- we do have evidence -- of connections over the years between Iraq and al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. 4
1/26/03 Powell Nuclear Why is Iraq still trying to procure uranium and the special equipment needed to transform it into material for nuclear weapons? 13
1/26/03 Powell Al Qaeda The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again. 42
1/27/03 Powell Al Qaeda QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have spoken, in Davos most recently, about a connection between Iraq and terrorist groups, including al Qaida. Are you saying there is evidence that that has happened in the past, or is there evidence currently that there's still a connection? SECRETARY POWELL: I think we have said consistently all along, through last fall and into this year, that we have seen contacts and connections between the Iraqi regime and terrorist organizations, to include al Qaida. As we have been able to focus on this more and look back in time, I think we're more confident of that assessment and we see no reason not to believe that such contacts and the presence of al Qaida elements or individuals in Iraq is a reasonable assumption, and we have some basis for that assumption. 4
1/28/03 Bush Nuclear Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. 6
1/28/03 Bush Nuclear The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. 14
1/28/03 Bush Al Qaeda Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses, and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other planes -- this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. 26
1/28/03 Bush Al Qaeda Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help develop their own. 27
1/29/03 Rumsfeld Nuclear You have a country that is out in the world buying things that are necessary for the development and progress in their . . . nuclear programs. 3
1/29/03 Rumsfeld Nuclear His regime has the design for a nuclear weapon, was working on several different methods of enriching uranium . . . . 3
1/29/03 Powell Al Qaeda QUESTION: What have you got on the other front linking Iraq with al Qaida and Usama bin Laden? POWELL: We do have information that suggests that there have been links over the years, and continue to be links, between the Iraqi Government and al Qaida. And the more we look at this the more we are able to look back in time and connect things with people who have come into our custody and other information has become available to us. It's clear that there is a link. 4
1/29/03 Powell Nuclear I hope that you will understand, as we believe we understand, that this is a danger, a danger to the world, for this kind of regime and this kind of man, Saddam Hussein, to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction--chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons. 8
1/29/03 Powell Nuclear And we will also put forward additional information that will substantiate the claim that they do have programs to develop chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear weapons. 8
1/29/03 Rumsfeld Al Qaeda The regime plays host to terrorists, including Al Qaida, as the president indicated. 9
1/29/03 Rumsfeld Nuclear His regime has the design for a nuclear weapon, was working on several different methods of enriching uranium, and recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa. 56
1/30/03 Cheney Al Qaeda His regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. He could decide secretly to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against us. 34
2/3/03 Powell Al Qaeda And, perhaps most critically, the President confirmed that Iraq has open channels and ties to terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. 4
2/4/03 Rumsfeld Al Qaeda QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, today in a broadcast interview Saddam Hussein said: There is only one truth, Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever." And he went on to say, "I would like to tell you directly we have no relationship with Al Qaida." SECRETARY RUMSFELD: And Abraham Lincoln was short." 4
2/5/03 Powell Chem/Bio How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemical munitions. 1
2/5/03 Powell Chem/Bio Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. 1
2/5/03 Powell Nuclear [H]e has made repeated covert attempts to aquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most US experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. 6
2/5/03 Rice Al Qaeda QUESTION: Is there any question in your mind about the al Qaeda connection? Did Powell totally convince people today in that area? RICE: There is no question in my mind about the al Qaeda connection. It is a connection that has unfolded, that we're learning more about as we are able to take the testimony of detainees, people who were high up in the al Qaeda organization. And what emerges is a picture of a Saddam Hussein who became impressed with what al Qaeda did after it bombed our embassies in 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania, began to give them assistance in chemical and biological weapons, something that they were having trouble achieving on their own, that harbored a terrorist network under this man Zarqawi, despite the fact that Saddam Hussein was told that Zarqawi was there. 9
2/5/03 Powell Al Qaeda But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants. . . . From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond. . . . We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. . . . A detained al-Qaida member tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist al-Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies . . . . Some believe, some claim, these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction. 38
2/5/03 Powell Chem/Bio Now, umanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV would look like. This effort has included attempts to modify for unmanned flight the MiG-21 and, with greater success, an aircraft called the L-29. However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes but on developing and testing smaller UAVs such as this. UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs. 39
2/5/03 Powell Chem/Bio Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan. 40
2/6/03 Bush Al Qaeda Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training. We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network, headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner. 9
2/6/03 Bush Al Qaeda And the United States, along with a growing coalition of nations, is resolved to take whatever action is necessary to defend ourselves and disarm the Iraqi regime. September the 11th, 2001, the American people saw what terrorists could do by turning four airplanes into weapons. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. 19
2/6/03 Bush Chem/Bio All the world has now seen the footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank modified to spray biological agents over wide areas. Iraq has developed spray devices that could be used on unmanned aerial vehicals with ranges far beyond what is permitted by the Security Council. A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland. 21
2/8/03 Bush Al Qaeda One of the greatest dangers we face is that weapons of mass destruction might be passed to terrorists who would not hesitate to use those weapons. Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraq intelligence and al Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training. And an al Qaeda operative was sent to Iraq several times in the late 1990s for help in aquiring poisons and gases. We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner. 20
2/16/03 Rice Al Qaeda Well, we are, of course, continually learning more about these links between Iraq and al Qaeda, and there is evidence that Secretary Powell did not have the time to talk about. But the core of the story is there in what Secretary Powell talked about. This poisons network with at least two dozen of its operatives operating in Baghdad, a man who is spreading poisons now throughout Europe and into Russia, a man who got medical care in Baghdad despite the fact that the Iraqis were asked to turn him over, training in biological and chemical weapons. 4
2/25/03 Bush Urgent But the risk of doing nothing, the risk of the security of this country being jeopardized at the hands of a madman with weapons of mass destruction far exceeds the risks of any action we may be forced to take. 5
2/25/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio QUESTION: There've been a lot of reports . . . In regard to these . . . very small aircraft, that potentially could deliver biological things. . . SECRETARY RUMSFELD: They come in a variety of sizes and shapes and capabilities. They are perfectly capable of being equipped with spraying and aerosol-type capabilities. Today with global position systems, GPS, and the kinds of maps that one can buy readily, these types of things can be purchased and used and guided and directed with great precision and capable of dispensing those kinds of weapons. They do exist. We know that Iraq has a number of so-called UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles, of different types, that they train with them and exercise them. 59
3/6/03 Bush Al Qaeda He has trained and financed al Qaeda-type organizations before, al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. 4
3/9/03 Powell Al Qaeda QUESTION: Another rationale provided by the administration for action against Saddam is his connection to al Qaida. Tom Friedman, in the New York Times, wrote this: I am also very troubled by the way Bush officials have tried to justify this war on the grounds that Saddam is allied with Usama bin Laden or will be soon. There is simply no proof of that, and every time I hear them repeat it, I think of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution from the Vietnam times. You don't take the country to war on the wings of a lie." SECRETARY POWELL: I don’t think it's a lie. I think there is information and evidence that there are connections. We have talked about Mr. al-Zarqawi and some of the people who are in Baghdad who are linked with al-Qaida and Usama bin Laden and who were there with the certain knowledge of the Iraqi regime. We have seen connections and we are continuing to pursue those connections. . . . And the fact that there is also an al-Qaida connection, I think certainly adds to the case." 4
3/9/03 Rice Al Qaeda Now the al-Qaida is an organization that's quite disbursed and --and quite widespread in its effects, but it clearly has had links to the Iraqis, not to mention Iraqi links to all kinds of other terrorists. And what we do not want is the day when Saddam Hussein decides that he's had enough of dealing with sanctions, enough of dealing with, quote, unquote, containment," enough of dealing with America, and it's time to end it on his terms, by transferring one of these weapons, just a little vial of something, to a terrorist for blackmail or for worse." 16
3/11/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio He claims to have no chemical or biological weapons, yet we know that he continues to hide biological or chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours, and placing them in residential neighborhoods. 1
3/16/03 Cheney Nuclear We know he's out trying once again to produce nuclear weapons . . . . 12
3/16/03 Cheney Nuclear QUESTION: What do you think is the most important rationale for going to war with Iraq? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: Well, I think I've just given it, Tim, in terms of the combination of his development and use of chemical weapons, his development of biological weapons, his pursuit of nuclear weapons. 18
3/16/03 Cheney Nuclear He's had years to get good at it and we know he has been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. 31
3/16/03 Cheney Al Qaeda I have argued in the past, and would again, if we had been able to pre-empt the attacks of 9/11 would we have done it? And I think absolutely. We have to be prepared now to take the kind of bold action that's being contemplated with respect to Iraq in order to ensure that we don't get hit with a devastating attack when the terrorists' organization gets married up with a rogue state that's willing to provide it with the kinds of deadly capabilities that Saddam Hussein has developed and used over the years. 36
3/16/03 Cheney Al Qaeda And Saddam Hussein becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his past track record and because we know he has, in fact, developed these kinds of capabilities, chemical and biological weapons. . . We know that he has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including the al-Qaeda organization. 37
3/17/03 Bush Al Qaeda The regime . . . has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other. 16
3/20/03 Rumsfeld Urgent With each passing day, Saddam Hussein advances his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and could pass them along to terrorists. If he is allowed to do so, the result could be the deaths not of 3,000 people, as on September 11th, but of 30,000, or 300,000 or more innocent people. 61
3/23/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio We have seen . . . intelligence over--over months, over many months that they have chemical and biological weapons, and that they have dispersed them and that they're weaponized . . . . 1
3/24/03 Cheney Chem/Bio The issue is that he has chemical weapons and he's used them. 1
3/25/03 Powell Chem/Bio We know they have chemical weapons. 1
3/30/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio The area in the south and the west and the north that coalition forces control is, is substantial. It happens not to be the area where weapons of mass destruction were dispersed. We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south, and north somewhat. Second, the kernel facilities, there are dozens of them, it is a large geographic area . . . I would also add that we saw from the air there were dozens of trucks that went into that facility after the existence of it became public in the press, and they moved things out. They dispersed them and took them away. So there may be nothing left. I don't know that. But it's way too soon to know. The exploration is just starting. 1
5/1/03 Bush Al Qaeda The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more. 7
5/1/03 Bush Al Qaeda The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 -- and still goes on. That terrible morning, 19 evil men -- the shock troops of a hateful ideology -- gave America and the civilized world a glimpse of their ambitions. They imagined, in the words of one terrorist, that September the 11th would be the 'beginning of the end of America.' By seeking to turn our cities into killing fields, terrorists and their allies believed that they could destroy this nation's resolve, and force our retreat from the world. They have failed. 11
5/16/03 Powell Chem/Bio QUESTION: Do you think they will find any (WMDs)? SECRETARY POWELL: Yes, I am quite sure. And, in fact, we have found a couple of items of equipment, some mobile vans, so that with each passing day the evidence is clearer to us that they were used for biological weapons purposes. 2
5/21/03 Powell Chem/Bio The intelligence community has really looked hard at these vans, and we can find no other purpose for them. Although you can’t find actual germs on them, they have been cleaned and we don't know whether they have been used for that purpose or not, but they were certainly designed and contructed for that purpose. And we have taken our time on this one because we wanted to make sure we got it right. And the intelligence community, I think, is convinced now that that's the purpose they served. 2
5/22/03 Powell Chem/Bio So far, we have found the biological weapons vans that I spoke about when I presented the case to the United Nations on the 5th of February, and there is no doubt in our minds now that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that was to make biological weapons. 2
5/22/03 Powell Chem/Bio The mobile vans that you may have been reading about, it is becoming clear that these vans can have no other purpose than the production of biological weapons. 2
5/27/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio QUESTION: Weapons of mass destruction, we are still searching. No conclusive evidence as of yet, I'm sure you've heard the criticism. Were, as perhaps Senator Byrd suggested, were we misled about the weapons of mass destruction? SECRETARY RUMSFELD: Oh I don't believe so, I think the intelligence community provided the best intelligence available and that we will find additional substantiating evidence of that. Colin Powell if you may recall at the UN mentioned the existence of these mobile biological laboratories and two of those are now in our custody and they seem to look very much like precisely what Colin Powell said would exist. 2
5/28/03 Rice Chem/Bio We have found, in Iraq, biological weapons laboratories that look precisely like what Secretary Powell described in his February 5th report to the United Nations. 2
5/29/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio Now people are saying, Well, why haven't we found anything?" And I would respond by saying, A, it's going take some time, and B, we have found things. The CIA very recently, I believe, issued a declassified document on their website, where someone can actually go and find photographs and data that discusses these mobile laboratories, which are precisely what Secretary Powell talked about to the United Nations." 2
5/29/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio And within the last week or two, they have in fact captured and have in custody two of the mobile trailers that Secretary Powell talked about at the United Nations as being biological weapons laboratories. We have people who are telling that they worked in these vehicles. And they look at panels and say, That was my work station in that panel, and that's what it's for."" 2
5/29/03 Rumsfeld Chem/Bio My personal view is we're going to find them, just as we found these two mobile laboratories. 2
5/29/03 Bush Chem/Bio We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories. You remember when Colin Powell stood up in front of the world, and he said, Iraq has got laboratories, mobile labs to build biological weapons. They're illegal. They're against the United Nations resolutions, and we've so far discovered two. And we'll find more weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong, we found them. 2
5/29/03 Rumsfeld Nuclear We believed then, and we believe now, that the Iraqis . . . had a program to develop nuclear weapons, but did not have nuclear weapons. That is what the United Kingdom's intelligence suggested as well. We still believe that. 58
5/30/03 Powell Chem/Bio The biological weapons facilities, the mobile one that the DIA and CIA put a paper out on the other day, I think make it clear that there is such a capability that's existed over the years. 2
5/30/03 Powell Chem/Bio The presentation I made on the 5th of February, where I put up the cartoons of those biological vans, we didn't just make them up one night. Those were eyewitness accounts of people who had worked in the program and knew what was going on, multiple accounts. We have examined those vans repeatedly for the last several weeks, and we are confident that's what they are. Now there will be other theories that come from time to time -- oh, it was a hydrogen making thing for balloons. No. But, there's not question in the mind of the intelligence community as to what it was designed for. And so that is a case of clear solid evidence. 2
6/1/03 Bush Chem/Bio Here's what -- we've discovered a weapons system, biological labs, that Iraq denied she had, and labs that were prohibited under the U.N. resolutions. 2
6/2/03 Powell Chem/Bio And we made a case, I made the case to the United Nations just in February as to what we knew, and I showed drawings of a biological laboratory. We found that biological laboratory, now everybody can see it. 2
6/2/03 Powell Chem/Bio Now we found some mobile labs, we're interviewing people, we have a lot of documents that have come into our possession and we'll be examining that. 2
6/3/03 Rice Chem/Bio But let's remember what we've already found. Secretary Powell on February 5th talked about a mobile, biological weapons capability. That has now been found and this is a weapons laboratory trailers capable of making a lot of agent that -- dry agent, dry biological agent that can kill a lot of people. So we are finding these pieces that were described. 2
6/3/03 Rice Chem/Bio QUESTION: OK. Let's be careful and precise here, because that's what this whole argument going on right now is about. Do we know that those trailers were used for developing biological weapons? MS. RICE: We know that these trailers look exactly like what was described to us by multiple sources as the capabilities for building or for making biological agents. We know that we have from multiple sources who told us that then and sources who have confirmed it now. Now the Iraqis were not stupid about this. They were able to conceal a lot. They've been able to scrub things down. But I think when the whole picture comes out, we will see that this was an active program. 2
6/5/03 Bush Chem/Bio We recently found two mobile biological weapons facilities which were capable of producing biological agents. 2
6/8/03 Powell Chem/Bio One element that I presented at that time, these biological vans, all I could show was a cartoon drawing of these vans, and everybody said, Are the vans really there?" And, voila, the vans showed up a few months later. We found them." 2
6/8/03 Powell Chem/Bio I can assure you that if those biological vans were not biological vans when I said they were on the 5th of February, on the 6th of February Iraq would have hauled those vans out, put them in front of a press conference, gave them to the UNMOVIC inspectors to try to drive a stake in the heart of my presentation. They did not. The reason they did not is they knew what they were. 2
6/8/03 Powell Chem/Bio And I would put before you Exhibit A, the mobile biological labs that we have found. 2
6/8/03 Powell Chem/Bio We have uncovered the mobile vans and we are continuing to search. 2
6/8/03 Powell Chem/Bio And I think the mobile labs are what I think is a good indication of the kind of thing they are doing. 2
6/8/03 Rice Chem/Bio QUESTIONS: You are confident you will find weapons of mass destruction. MS. RICE: We are confident that we -- I believe that we will find them. I think that we have already found important clues like the biological weapons laboratories that look surprisingly like what Colin Powell described in his speech. 2
6/8/03 Rice Chem/Bio Already, we've discovered, uh, uh, trailers, uh, that look remarkably similar to what Colin Powell described in his February 5th speech, biological weapons production facilities. 2
6/8/03 Rice Nuclear And there were other attempts to, to get yellow cake from Africa. 14
6/8/03 Rice Nuclear At the time that the State of the Union address was prepared, there were also other sources that said that they were, the Iraqis were seeking yellow cake, uranium oxide from Africa. 14
6/8/03 Rice Nuclear QUESTION: [T]his is what appeared in the Washington Post: A key piece of evidence linking Iraq to a nuclear weapons program appears to have been fabricated, the United Nations' chief nuclear inspector said in a report that called into question U.S. and British claims about Iraq's secret nuclear ambitions. . . . " In light of that, should the president retract those comments? . . . MS. RICE: The president quoted a British paper. We did not know at the time -- no one knew at the time, in our circles -- maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery." 44
6/8/03 Rice Nuclear The intelligence community did not know at that time or at levels that got to us that this, that there was serious questions about this report. 47
6/12/03 Powell Chem/Bio I think that we will be able to demonstrate convincingly through the mobile labs, through documentation, through interviews, through what we find, that we knew what we were speaking about. 2
6/12/03 Powell Chem/Bio The biological weapons labs that we believe strongly are biological weapons labs, we didn't find any biological weapons with those labs. But should that give us any comfort? Not at all. Those were labs that could produce biological weapons whenever Saddam Hussein might have wanted to have a biological weapons inventory. 2
6/23/03 Powell Chem/Bio The mobile biological laboratories that were found and presented to the world, I think, is a further evidence of this, and so, at the same time that we continue our efforts to uncover those weapons programs. 2
6/27/03 Powell Chem/Bio The imminent threat is that suddenly, this biological warfare lab, for example, could have been put to use. 2
6/30/03 Powell Chem/Bio We have found the mobile biological weapons labs that I could only show cartoons of that day. 2
7/2/03 Powell Chem/Bio Take the mobile vans that we've been talking about, the biological vans. I can assure you, Sean, that when I presented those vans to the world on the 5th of February and described them, all I could put up were pictures or cartoons that we made of them. And later, we actually found them and showed them to the world. 2
7/10/03 Powell Chem/Bio One item I showed was cartoons of the mobile biological van. They were cartoons, artist's renderings, because we had never seen one of these things, but we had good sourcing on it, excellent sourcing on it. And we knew what it would look like when we found it, so we made those pictures. And I can assure you I didn't just throw those pictures up without having quite a bit of confidence in the information that I had been provided and that Director Tenet had been provided and was now supporting me in the presentation on, sitting right behind me. And we waited. And it took a couple of months, and it took until after the war, until we found a van and another van that pretty much matched what we said it would look like. And I think that's a pretty good indication that we were not cooking the books. 2
7/11/03 Rice Nuclear Now, I can tell you, if the CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence, had said, take this out of the speech, it would have been gone, without question. What we've said subsequently is, knowing what we now know, that some of the Niger documents were apparently forged, we wouldn't have put this in the President's speech - but that's knowing what we know now. 45
7/11/03 Rice Nuclear [T]he NIE, which, by the way, the Agency was standing by at the time of the . . . State of the Union, and was standing by at the time of the Secretary's speech, has the yellow cake story in it. . . . Now, if there were doubts about the underlying intelligence to that NIE, those doubts were not communicated to the President, to the Vice President, or to me. 46
7/11/03 Rice Nuclear So the process is an NIE that is the basis of this, and then if the Agency had reservations about information that was in the NIE, then the DCI -- and I think he will tell you that if he had reservations, he did not make those known to the President, to the Vice President, or to me -- if he had reservations. 48
7/11/03 Rice Nuclear The only thing that was there in the NIE was a kind of a standard INR footnote, which is kind of 59 pages away from the bulk of the NIE. That's the only thing that's there. And you have footnotes all the time in CIA - I mean, in NIEs. So if there was a concern about the underlying intelligence there, the President was unaware of that concern and as was I. 49
7/13/03 Rice Nuclear My only point is that, in retrospect, knowing that some of the documents underneath may have been--were, indeed, forgeries, and knowing that apparently there were concerns swirling around about this, had we known that at the time, we would not have put it in. . . . And had there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the director of Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone. 43
7/13/03 Rumsfeld Nuclear We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any debate. 55
7/17/03 Bush Nuclear I strongly believe he was trying to reconstitute his nuclear weapons program. 12
7/30/03 Rice Nuclear [H]e had . . . an active procurement network to procure items, many of which, by the way, were on the prohibited list of the nuclear suppliers group. There's a reason that they were on the prohibited list of the nuclear supplies group: Magnets, balancing machines, yes, aluminum tubes, about which the consensus view was that they were suitable for use in centrifuges to spin material for nuclear weapons. 6
7/31/03 Rice Nuclear Going into the war against Iraq, we had very strong intelligence. I've been in this business for 20 years. And some of the strongest intelligence cases that I've seen, key judgments by our intelligence community that Saddam Hussein could have a nuclear weapons by the end of the decade, if left unchecked . . . that he was trying to reconstitute his nuclear program. 12
7/31/03 Rice Chem/Bio Going into the war against Iraq, we had very strong intelligence. I've been in this business for 20 years. And some of the strongest intelligence cases that I've seen, key judments by our intelligence community that Saddam Hussein . . . had biological and chemical weapons . . . . 53
9/7/03 Rice Al Qaeda QUESTION: Do you believe, because this is continually a subject of debate, that there was a link between al Qaeda and the regime of Saddam Hussein before the war? MS. RICE: Absolutely. . . . But we know that there was training of al Qaeda in chemical and perhaps biological warfare. We know that the Zarqawi was network out of there, this poisons network that was trying to spread poisons throughout . . . . And there was an Ansar al-Islam, which appears also to try to be operating in Iraq. So yes, the al Qaeda link was there. 52
9/14/03 Cheney Chem/Bio Same on biological weapons--we believe he'd developed the capacity to go mobile with his BW production capability because, again, in reaction to what we had done to him in '91. We had intelligence reporting before the war that there were at least seven of these mobile labs that he had gone out and acquired. We've, since the war, found two of them. They're in our possession today, mobile biological facilities that can be used to produce anthrax or smallpox or whatever else you wanted to use during the course of developing the capacity for an attack. 2
9/14/03 Cheney Al Qaeda [Since September 11] We learned more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda that stretched back through most of the decade of the '90s, that it involved training, for example, on BW and CW, that al-Qaeda sent personnel to Baghdad to get trained on the systems that are involved. The Iraqis providing bomb-making expertise and advice to the al-Qaeda organization. 9
9/14/03 Cheney Al Qaeda With respect to 9/11, of course, we've had the story that's been public out there. The Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack, but we've never been able to develop anymore of that yet either in terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don't know. 17
9/14/03 Cheney Al Qaeda If we're successful in Iraq, if we can stand up a good representative government in Iraq, that secures the region so that it never again becomes a threat to its neighbors or to the United States, so it's not pursuing weapons of mass destruction, so that it's not a safe haven for terrorists, now we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11. 30
9/28/03 Rice Al Qaeda Saddam Hussein -- no one has said that there is evidence that Saddam Hussein directed or controlled 9/11, but let's be very clear, he had ties to al-Qaeda, he had al-Qaeda operatives who had operated out of Baghdad. 4
9/28/03 Rice Nuclear On nuclear there was dissent on the extent of the program and how far along the program might be. How much had he gone to reconstitute? But the judgment of the intelligence community was that he had kept in place his infrastructure, that he was trying to procure items. For instance, there's been a lot of talk about the aluminum tubes but they were prohibited on the list of the nuclear suppliers group for a reason. 6
10/3/03 Powell Chem/Bio It isn't a figment of anyone's imagination that just 15 years ago they gassed and killed 5,000 people with sarin and VX at a place called Halabja I visited just a few weeks ago. They never lost that capability. 1
10/3/03 Cheney Al Qaeda And the reason we had to do Iraq, if you hark back and think about that link between the terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, Iraq was the place where we were most fearful that that was most likely to occur, because in Iraq we've had a government -- not only was it one of the worst dictatorships in modern times, but had oftentimes hosted terrorists in the past . . . but also an established relationship with the al Qaeda organization . . . . 4
10/3/03 Cheney Nuclear If we had had that information and ignored it, if we'd been told, as we were, by the intelligence community that he was capable of producing a nuclear weapon within a year if he could acquire fissile material and ignored it . . . we would have been derelict in our duties and responsibilities. 10
10/3/03 Cheney Al Qaeda [I]f we had not paid any attention to the fact that al Qaeda was being hosted in Northeastern Iraq, part of poisons network producing ricin and cyanide that was intended to be used in attacks both in Europe, as well as in North Africa and ignored it, we would have been derelict in our duties and responsibilities. 15
10/3/03 Cheney Al Qaeda Al Qaida had a base of operation there up in Northeastern Iraq where they ran a large poisons factory for attacks against Europeans and U.S. forces. 15
10/5/03 Cheney Al Qaeda Al Qaida had a base of operation there up in Northeastern Iraq where they ran a large poisons factory for attacks against Europeans and U.S. forces. 15
10/10/03 Cheney Al Qaeda He cultivated ties to terror, hosting the Abu Nidal organization, supporting terrorists, making payments to the families of suicide bombers in Israel. He also had an established relationship with al Qaeda, providing training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons, gases, making conventional bombs. 4
10/18/03 Cheney Al Qaeda Saddam Hussein had a lengthy history of reckless and sudden aggression. He cultivated ties to terror -- hosting the Abu Nidal organization, supporting terrorists, and making payments to the families of suicide bombers. He also had an established relationship with Al Qaida -- providing training to Al Qaida members in areas of poisons, gases and conventional bombs. He built, possessed, and used weapons of mass destruction. 9
11/2/03 Rumsfeld Al Qaeda We said from the outset that there are several terrorist networks that have global reach and that there were several countries that were harboring terrorists that have global reach. We weren't going into Iraq when we were hit on September 11. And the question is: Well, what do you do about that? If you know there are terrorists and you know there's terrorist states -- Iraq's been a terrorist state for decades -- and you know there are countries harboring terrorists, we believe, correctly, I think, that the only way to deal with it is -- you can't just hunker down and hope they won't hit you again. You simply have to take the battle to them. And we have been consistently working on the Al Qaeda network. We've captured a large number of those folks -- captured or killed -- just as we've now captured or killed a large number of the top 55 Saddam Hussein loyalists. 11
1/9/04 Cheney Al Qaeda We did have reporting that was public, that came out shortly after the 9/11 attack, provided by the Czech government, suggesting there had been a meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker, and a man named al-Ani (Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani), who was an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague, at the embassy there, in April of '01, prior to the 9/11 attacks. It has never been -- we've never been able to collect any more information on that. That was the one that possibly tied the two together to 9/11. 17
1/9/04 Cheney Nuclear [T]he reporting that we had prior to the war this time around was all consistent with that -- basically said that he had a chemical, biological and nuclear program, and estimated that if he could acquire fissile material, he could have a nuclear weapon within a year or two. 18
1/9/04 Cheney Al Qaeda QUESTION: When I was in Iraq, some of the soldiers said they believed they were fighting because of the Sept. 11 attacks and because they thought Saddam Hussein had ties to al Qaida. You've repeatedly cited such links. . . . I wanted to ask you what you'd say to those soldiers, and were those soldiers misled at all? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: . . . . With respect to . . . the general relationship. . . . One place you ought to go look is an article that Stephen Hayes did in the Weekly Standard . . . That goes through and lays out in some detail, based on an assessment that was done by the Department of Defense and forwarded to the Senate Intelligence Committee some weeks ago. That's your best source of information. I can give you a few quick for instances, one the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. QUESTION: Yes, sir . . . . VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: The main perpetrator was a man named Ramzi Yousef. He's now in prison in Colorado. His sidekick in the exercise was a man named Abdul Rahman Yasin. . . Ahman Rahman . . . Yasin is his last name anyway. I can't remember his earlier first names. He fled the United States after the attack, the 1993 attack, went to Iraq, and we know now based on documents that we've captured since we took Baghdad, that they put him on the payroll, gave him a monthly stipend and provided him with a house, sanctuary, in effect, in Iraq, in the aftermath of nine-ele (sic) . . . the 93' attack on the World Trade Center. QUESTION: So you stand by the statements? VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: Absolutely. Absolutely. And you can look at Zarkawi, (Abu Mussab) al-Zarkawi . . . Who was an al-Qaida associate, who was wounded in Afghanistan, took refuge in Baghdad, working out of Baghdad, worked with the Ansar al Islam group up in northeastern Iraq, that produced a so-called poison factory, a group that we hit when we went into Iraq. . . . We'll find ample evidence confirming the link, that is the connection if you will between al Qaida and the Iraqi intelligence services. They have worked together on a number of occasions. 33
1/14/04 Cheney Al Qaeda Saddam Hussein had a lengthy history of reckless and sudden aggression. His regime cultivated ties to terror, including the al Qaeda network, and had built, possessed, and used weapons of mass destruction. 4
1/15/04 Cheney Al Qaeda Saddam Hussein had a lengthy history of reckless and sudden aggression. His regime cultivated ties to terror, including the al Qaeda network, and had built, possessed, and used weapons of mass destruction. 4
1/22/04 Cheney Chem/Bio In terms of the question what is there now, we know for example that prior to our going in that he had spent time and effort acquiring mobile biological weapons labs, and we're quite confident he did, in fact, have such a program. We've found a couple of semi trailers at this point which we believe were, in fact, part of that program. 2
1/22/04 Cheney Al Qaeda I continue to believe. I think there's overwhelming evidence that there was a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government. We've discovered since documents indicating that a guy named Abdul Rahman Yasin, who was a part of the team that attacked the World Trade Center in '93, when he arrived back in Iraq was put on the payroll and provided a house, safe harbor and sanctuary. That's public information now. So Saddam Hussein had an established track record of providing safe harbor and sanctuary for terrorists. . . . I mean, this is a guy who was an advocate and a supporter of terrorism whenever it suited his purpose, and I'm very confident that there was an established relationship there. 4
Footnote Why This Statement is Misleading
1 This statement was misleading because it professed certainty when the intelligence community provided only an "estimate." According to CIA Director George Tenet, "it is important to underline the word estimate. Because not everything we analyze can be known to a standard of absolute proof." In addition, the statement failed to acknowledge the Defense Intelligence Agency position that: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."
2 This statement was misleading because it claimed the purpose of the trailers was to produce biological weapons without disclosing that engineers from the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined the trailers concluded that they were most likely used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons.
3 This statement was misleading because it failed to acknowledge the intelligence community's deep division on the issue of whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear program.
4 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship.
5 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq posed an urgent threat despite the fact that the U.S. intelligence community had deep divisions and divergent points of view regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. As Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet noted in February 2004, "Let me be clear: analysts differed on several important aspects of these programs and those debates were spelled out in the Estimate. They never said there was an 'imminent' threat."
6 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq sought aluminum tubes for use in its nuclear weapons program, failing to mention that the government’s most experienced technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy concluded that the tubes were "poorly suited" for this purpose.
7 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq was linked to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship.
8 This statement was misleading because it failed to acknowledge the intelligence community's deep division on the issue of whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear program. In addition, it failed to acknowledge the Defense Intelligence Agency position that: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."
9 This statement was misleading because it asserted that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship.
10 This statement was misleading because it failed to provide the context that the U.S. intelligence community believed that Iraq probably would not be able to make a nuclear weapon until near the end of the decade.
11 This statement was misleading because by referencing the September 11 attacks in conjunction with discussion of the war on terror in Iraq, it left the impression that Iraq was connected to September 11. In fact, President Bush himself in September 2003 acknowledged that "We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th."
12 This statement was misleading because it failed to acknowledge the intelligence community's deep division on the issue of whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear program. The statement also failed to mention weeks of intensive inspections conducted directly before the war in which United Nations inspectors found no sign whatsoever of any effort by Iraq to resume its nuclear program.
13 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq sought to acquire uranium despite the fact that the CIA expressed doubts about the credibility of this claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. CIA Director George Tenet also warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice's deputy. In addition, the statement fails to mention that State Department intelligence officials also concluded that this claim was "highly dubious."
14 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq sought uranium from Africa despite the fact that the CIA expressed doubts about the credibility of this claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. CIA Director George Tenet also warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice's deputy. In addition, the statement fails to mention that State Department intelligence officials also concluded that this claim was "highly dubious."
15 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. The statement also refers to al Qaeda in Northeastern Iraq without acknowledging that this area was not controlled by Saddam Hussein.
16 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. This statement also was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario.
17 This statement is misleading because it describes a Czech government report of a meeting between Mohammed Atta and Iraq intelligence official Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in April 2001 and states that there hasn’t been more information on that, despite the fact that Czech intelligence officials were skeptical about the report; U.S. intelligence had contradictory evidence regarding this report, such as records indicating Atta was in Virginia at the time of the meeting; and the C.I.A. and F.B.I. had concluded the meeting probably didn’t occur.
18 This statement was misleading because it failed to acknowledge the intelligence community's deep division on the issue of whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear program. The statement also failed to mention weeks of intensive inspections conducted directly before the war in which United Nations inspectors found no sign whatsoever of any effort by Iraq to resume its nuclear program. In addition, it failed to acknowledge the Defense Intelligence Agency position that: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."
19 This statement was misleading because by referencing the September 11 attacks in conjunction with discussion of the war on terror in Iraq, it left the impression that Iraq was connected to September 11. In fact, President Bush himself in September 2003 acknowledged "We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th." This statement also was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing terrorists who would attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario, and Iraq appeared to be "drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks" against the United States for fear of providing cause for war.
20 This statement was misleading because it asserted that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. The statement also was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario.
21 This statement was misleading because it claimed that Iraq’s UAVs were intended and able to spread biological weapons, including over the United States, but failed to mention that the U.S. government agency most knowledgeable about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, had the following view: the "U.S. Air Force does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents."
22 This statement was misleading because it claimed that Iraq’s UAVs were intended and able to spread chemical or biological weapons, including over the United States, but failed to mention that the U.S. government agency most knowledgeable about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, had the following view: the "U.S. Air Force does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents."
23 This statement was misleading because it evoked a lethal threat to millions of individuals from Iraq's biological weapons but failed to acknowledge that the U.S. intelligence community had reported on Iraq's biological weapons capabilities with qualifiers and lack of specificity. For example, the October 2002 NIE estimated simply that Iraq had "some" BW agents that were lethal and incapacitating, "including anthrax."
24 This statement was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing Al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario, and the intelligence community believed that Iraq appeared to be "drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks" against the United States for fear of providing cause for war.
25 This statement was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing terrorists who would attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario, and Iraq appeared to be "drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks" against the United States for fear of providing cause for war.
26 This statement was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing terrorists who would attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario, and Iraq appeared to be "drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks" against the United States for fear of providing cause for war. This statement also was misleading because by referencing the September 11 attacks in conjunction with discussion of the war on terror in Iraq, it left the impression that Iraq was connected to September 11. In fact, President Bush himself in September 2003 acknowledge that "We've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th."
27 This statement was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing weapons to al Qaeda. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario.
28 This statement was misleading because it starkly evoked a threat of Iraq detonating a nuclear bomb when the intelligence community was deeply divided on the issue of whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear program.
29 This statement was misleading because it starkly evoked a threat of Iraq detonating a nuclear bomb when there was deep division in the intelligence community on the issue of whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear program.
30 This statement is misleading because it states that Iraq is the "heart" of the geographic base for terrorists who assaulted the United States on September 11, despite the fact that intelligence officials do not have evidence that Iraq was linked to the September 11 attack.
31 This statement was false because the intelligence community did not believe that Iraq actually possessed nuclear weapons.
32 This statement was misleading because by referencing the September 11 attacks in conjunction with discussion of the war on terror in Iraq, it left the impression that Iraq was connected to September 11. In fact, President Bush himself in September 2003 acknowledged that "We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th." The statement also was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing terrorists who would attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario.
33 This statement was misleading because it asserted that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. The statement also refers to the Ansar al Islam group in Northeastern Iraq without acknowledging that this area was not controlled by Saddam Hussein.
34 This statement was misleading because it asserted that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. This statement also was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario, and Iraq appeared to be "drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks" against the United States for fear of providing cause for war.
35 This statement was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario, and Iraq appeared to be "drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks" against the United States for fear of providing cause for war.
36 This statement was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing terrorists who would attack the United Stateswith weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligene Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario, and Iraq appeared to be "drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks" against the United States for fear of providing cause for war.
37 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. In addition, the statement failed to acknowledge the Defense Intelligence Agency position that: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."
38 This presentation was misleading because it heavily emphasized reports supporting the assertion that a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda existed that posed a real threat to the United States, when in fact the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. While Secretary Powell, unlike several other top administration officials, included a reference to the fact that "some believe" that the contacts "don't amount to much," he did not make clear that this was a view within the U.S. intelligence community, and further he was dismissive of this position.
39 This statement was misleading because it claimed that Iraq’s UAVs were intended and able to spread chemical or biological weapons, but failed to mention that the U.S. government agency most knowledgeable about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, had the following view: the "U.S. Air Force does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents."
40 This statement was misleading because it evoked a lethal threat to millions of individuals from Iraq's chemical weapons but failed to acknowledge that the U.S. intelligence community had reported on Iraq's chemical wapons capabilities with qualifiers and lack of specificity. In addition, the statement failed to acknowledge a 2002 Defense Intelligence Agency report that concluded: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."
41 This statement was misleading because it evoked a threat of Iraq using UAVs to spread biological and chemical agents, but failed to mention that the U.S. government agency most knowledgeable about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, had the following view: the "U.S. Air Force does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents."
42 This statement was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario.
43 Ms. Rice was responding to questions regarding how the claim that Iraq sought uranium in Africa made it into the President's January 28, 2003, State of the Union address. The statement that the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA did not object to the claim was false. In October 2002, the CIA expressed doubts about the claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet also warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice’s deputy in October 2002.
44 The statement that "no one knew" about the doubts regarding the uranium claim was false. The statement contradicts the fact that the CIA in October 2002 had expressed doubts about the uranium claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet in October 2002 also had warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice’s deputy. In addition, the statement contradicts the fact that State Department intelligence officials had stated that this claim was "highly dubious" in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that had been provided to top White House officials.
45 The statement that the CIA did not object to the uranium claim is false. In October 2002, the CIA sent two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice, that raised concerns about the claim. In addition, in October 2002, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice’s deputy.
46 This statement was false. Ms. Rice made this statement in response to a question about why Secretary Powell had decided against using in his February 5, 2003, remarks the claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium whereas the President had used the claim just a week earlier in his State of the Union address. The October 1, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate Ms. Rice referenced in her statement did contain the uranium claim. However, subsequent to the issuance of the NIE, the CIA expressed doubts about the claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. Shortly after the issuance of the NIE, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet also warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice’s deputy.
47 This statement was false. Ms. Rice made this statement in response to the question of how the claim "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" made it into the President's January 28, 2003, State of the Union address. Her statement contradicted the fact that the CIA in October 2002 had expressed doubts about the claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet also in October 2002 had warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice’s deputy. In addition, Ms. Rice's statement contradicted the fact that State Department intelligence officials had stated that this claim was "highly dubious" in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that had been provided to top White House officials.
48 This statement was false. Ms. Rice was claiming in this statement that the doubts intelligence officials had regarding the claim in the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq sought uranium in Africa were not communicated to her. In fact, following the issuance of the National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA expressed doubts about the uranium claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. In addition, shortly after the issuance of the NIE, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice's deputy.
49 This statement was false. Ms. Rice was claiming in this statement that the doubts intelligence officials had regarding the claim in the National Intelligence Estimate that Iraq sought uranium in Africa were not communicated to her. In fact, following the issuance of the National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA expressed doubts about the uranium claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to Ms. Rice. In addition, shortly after the issuance of the NIE, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice's deputy. Further, the fact that INR objected to the NIE's nuclear statements was noted prominently in the first paragraph of the NIE's key judgments.
50 This statement was false. The government’s most experienced technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy concluded that the tubes were "poorly suited" for this purpose, and intelligence officials at the State Department concurred in this view.
51 This statement was misleading because it asserted that Iraq was linked to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship.
52 This statement was misleading because it asserted that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. This statement also failed to mention that Ansar al-Islam was based in the Kurdish area of Iraq beyond Saddam Hussein's control.
53 This statement was misleading because it failed to acknowledge the Defense Intelligence Agency position that: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."
54 This statement was misleading because it starkly evoked a threat of Iraq detonating a nuclear bomb when the intelligence community was deeply divided regarding whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear weapons program.
55 This statement was false because there were deep divisions within the intelligence community on the issue of whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear program. The statement also failed to mention weeks of intensive inspections conducted directly before the war in which United Nations inspectors found no sign whatsoever of any effort by Iraq to resume its nuclear program.
56 This statement was misleading because it asserted that Iraq sought uranium from Africa despite the fact that the CIA had expressed doubts about the credibility of this claim in two memos to the White House, including one addressed to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet also had warned against using the claim in a telephone call to Ms. Rice’s deputy. In addition, the statement failed to mention that State Department intelligence officials had concluded that this claim was "highly dubious."
57 This statement was misleading because it asserted that Iraq was providing support to al Qaeda. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community had conflicting evidence on this issue and was divided regarding whether there was an operational relationship. This statement also was misleading because it evoked the threat of Iraq providing al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" in that scenario.
58 This statement was misleading because it failed to acknowledge the intelligence community's deep division on the issue of whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear program. The statement also failed to mention that weeks of intensive inspections conducted directly before the war in which United Nations inspectors found no sign whatsoever of any effort by Iraq to resume its nuclear program.
59 This statement was misleading because it implied that Iraq’s UAVs were intended and able to spread chemical or biological weapons, but failed to mention that the U.S. government agency most knowledgeable about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, had the following view: the "U.S. Air Force does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents."
60 This statement was misleading because it starkly evoked a threat of Iraq detonating a nuclear bomb when the intelligence community was deeply divided regarding whether Saddam Hussein was divided on whether Iraq was actively pursuing its nuclear weapons program.
61 This statement was misleading because it suggested that Iraq posed an imminent threat despite the fact that the U.S. intelligence community had deep divisions and divergent points of view regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. As Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet noted in February 2004, "Let me be clear: analysts differed on several important aspects of these programs and those debates were spelled out in the Estimate. They never said there was an 'imminent' threat."
62 This statement was misleading because, by evoking the specter of thousands of deaths in a time frame as short as "a week, or a month," it suggested that Iraq posed an urgent threat. The U.S. intelligence community, however, had deep divisions and divergent points of view regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Further, according to the National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community had "low confidence" regarding whether Iraq would provide al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction.