Interview with Julian Borger, Guardian of London, United States Bureau Chief

July 15th, 2004
Transcription by Volunteer Citizen Journalist Connee Lloyd

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Why don't you introduce yourself and the newspaper you work for.
JULIAN BORGER: I'm Julian Borger. I'm the U.S. Bureau Chief for The Guardian newspaper.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Okay. And so when you look at the buildup to the war in Iraq -- How would you distinguish coverage that you would see from the United Kingdom versus what you saw here in the United States?
BORGER: I think the coverage in the British Press was far more aggressive than in the US. The US coverage tended to be quite reverential towards the administration in a way the British press wasn't. And that's a basic cultural difference in the newspaper worlds and the media worlds in the two countries. And that applied very much so to the buildup to the Iraq war -- and the issue of evidence for WMD -- and evidence of links between Baghdad and al Qaeda.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: And what do you attribute -- Why are there differences between the press in the United Kingdom versus here in the United States?
BORGER: I see them as cultural differences, really. There -- In Britain, the newspaper world -- and maybe the public at large -- is far more cynical about government. I think to a certain extent, there's a way in which American reporters -- reflecting an American population -- still believes in some way that if the information comes from the administration -- or from an administration agency -- then it has inherent worth. It may not be true, but there is reason to believe it is true. In a way, that's turned on its head in Britain. There's a deep-seated distrust of what you're being told by the government -- what you've been told by government agencies. And a much deeper-seated instinct to aggressively go out and find out if it's true.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Another difference I see between the United Kingdom and the United States is that they have more parties -- they have more than a two-party system. Do you see that that adds to the debate a little bit more -- and adds more viewpoints?
BORGER: Hard to say -- Because in a way in both countries, in the US --
ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Okay, I'm sorry. I'm not going to be including my questions -- So if you can incorporate the –
BORGER: All right, yeah. Hard to say whether the political structure had much of an impact. In both countries, in Britain and the US, you had a principal opposition party that was broadly, broadly supportive of going to war -- Or at least of putting a lot of pressure on Saddam Hussein up to the point of war -- the Tories in Britain and the Democrats here. So the political structure wasn't really a function. There were those -- Another sort of cultural difference in the media -- or maybe a structural difference in the relationship -- the power balance between the media and the government. And that's completely different in Britain. In Britain, the power balance between the press -- the national press and the government is very much more weighted towards the national press than it is here. There's much more dependence among American correspondents for access than there is in Britain. The British newspapers -- national newspapers can take the risk of really launching an aggressive attack on the government knowing that sooner or later, the government has to come back and talk to them again. And that it's in the interest of the government to come back and talk to that newspaper again. In the US, among correspondents on different beats -- in the Pentagon or the White House or whatever agency / department -- there's a fear of being frozen out. And I think that fear does form a -- in the background, it has to play a role. And that fear is always an inhibiting factor on the reporting of journalists who are assigned those particular beats.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: So during the buildup to the war in Iraq -- At what point did you see that -- Did you have some skepticism towards the case that was being made with weapons of mass destruction?
BORGER: I suppose I became most skeptical at the time of the famous aluminum tubes. And we did a story looking at the various claims made by the administration -- I think it was at the time of the Cincinnati speech in October 2002. And there had been a string of claims in that the aluminum tubes were to be used for centrifuges, and the drone aircraft, and so on. And I began to talk to people on the fringes of the intelligence world and also in the Department of Energy who said, "Well, we don't actually believe that these aluminum tubes are for centrifuges. We believe that they're probably for rockets, and they're not the right specifications." And then that all led to questioning more of the elements of the charges. And it turned out that the drone -- the threat of a drone aircraft distributing biological germ warfare in the United States of America -- on American soil -- was also extremely far-fetched. And it began to unravel. And it became clear that behind these claims, there was not all that much solid intelligence. It seemed to me at the time that it was likely that there were remnants of weapons of mass destruction from '91-'92. Because people I knew who seemed -- who were former weapons inspectors -- thought on balance, "There's probably something there. There are probably remnants there. But probably not very much." And they, at that time, were growing alarmed at the kind of claims that were being made by the British and American governments. So I think it was almost a consensus among the professionals in the field -- the former inspectors and the intelligence people -- that while there could be something still there, that it wasn't a threat -- that it wasn't an immediate threat. And there was never a sense from intelligence professionals -- here at least -- that there was solid evidence for a link between Baghdad and al Qaeda -- of that, there was almost unanimity inside the professional world. Ideologically is another story. But in the professional world, that always seemed clear.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Now it seems like -- You know, you're a foreign journalist, and you're doing reporting that -- outside of Knight-Ridder -- like almost no one else within the media establishment was really -- How was it that you were able to report on this? And was it because you were the only one asking the questions? Or what do you attribute that to -- getting these types of stories?
BORGER: It may be because I didn't have much access to the inner corridors of power. I didn't get called in to Langley for briefings or the White House for briefings. I had to go elsewhere and talk to more people on the fringes who had a completely different view. And that pointed me into directions that maybe -- if you'd gone to the briefings and got official briefings from senior officials, you wouldn't be pointed in that direction. The aluminum tubes as an example -- The people I talked to -- again on the fringes, but who kind of knew the debate going on -- pointed towards the fact that the people in the Department of Energy, in particular, were unhappy about the claims being made about the aluminum tubes. And so through that I got on to someone at the Department of Energy. Now if I had the official briefings, I might not have been pointed in that way. But in a way, it was a result of being outside the loop.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: One thing I noticed is that -- Sometimes things will break -- stories will break overseas in the British press, but then they don't seem to come across the ocean into the American press. Can you speak to that a little bit? Of this particular issue, is there an oversight of anything else that's going on outside our own borders of America?
BORGER: Can you re-phrase that one, I don't quite --
ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Well -- There are some stories such as Katharine Gun, for example, in mid-March, where there's stories -- Or the "dodgy dossier" in Britain. And kind of speak to those stories that didn't really pick up a lot of steam here in the United States.
BORGER: I think professional pride has a role to play here. If a story breaks abroad, especially in Britain, and the American press haven't got there, the instinctive reaction is, "Well, Ah. Those Brits -- Who knows if it's true?" And there's almost more of a tendency to ignore the story rather than even to check it out. And I found that again and again. If a story breaks in Britain, there's almost the automatic reaction is "Ah. It's the British press. It's tabloid. It's sensational" -- which is justified in many, many instances. The tabloid press and some of the broadsheet press in Britain can be fairly wild, and a lot of unsubstantiated stories get out. But on top of that instinctive reaction of "Well, it must be sensational because it was in the British press" is a reluctance to check it out properly. Or an over-readiness to accept assurances from the institutions -- the White House, whatever -- that although -- "There's nothing to the story. It's just a British story. Ignore it." There's a lack of -- almost a lack of hunger when it comes to stories that question the Administration's position. Until, that is, the Administration was so weakened by the failure of any WMD to appear. There was almost a turning of tides sometime last year, in 2003, when you suddenly saw a greater readiness to go over these stories. It was like the herd changing direction. It was very visible.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Speak a little bit about how you see American objectivity. You know, there's a standard here in the American press that -- And talk about the differences in the British press on that point.
BORGER: The American press have very high standards, and a lot of the journalists are of a very high caliber -- and they're extraordinarily conscientious -- they're very good at what they do. But there is an innate conservatism in journalism here -- that for it to be sensible and serious journalism it must be mild -- its conclusions must be mild. If you come to a really shocking and extraordinary conclusion, it must be sensational -- Therefore, it can't be "good journalism." And I think there is a sort of conservatism in the profession -- with the exceptions -- Knight-Ridder, Sy Hersh at the New Yorker -- but they really stood out. The rest of the crowd though has a much greater sense of caution, and a sense that if you're a "good journalist," the stuff you come out with must -- can't rock the boat too much -- it must -- it shouldn't be too far from the conventional wisdom.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Are you also talking about a "pack journalism" in a way -- You can't go too far outside -- Or in another way -- If they come to a conclusion, they have to have someone else say it, they can't say it?
BORGER: Yes, that's true. And in a way, maybe that is a good thing --
ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: I'm sorry, what is?
BORGER: Sorry. In a way, maybe it is a good thing, and it is something that in general I admire about the American press -- that there is a distinction -- a much firmer distinction between editorial and what you report -- and that you shouldn't be putting your views overtly in the piece. In the end it's a matter of style, because obviously your selection of quotes and your ordering of the story, your views will come through anyway. But I find it a less jarring style if you let those views come from other people, and you give an airing to other views. But it's this shying away from conclusions -- and shying away from strong conclusions that jar with the conventional wisdom -- that I think somehow shackles American journalism. And often you'll see in a -- One of the great stylistic differences between British and American journalism, is that in British journalism the main point -- the big-punch point -- will come in the first paragraph. American print journalism, you might not find out until the sixth or seventh. And I think, again, that is a symptom of this sense of -- feeling that serious journalism isn't sensational. Therefore, you don't want to put your most sensational point up front, because it might look like you're being flashy -- or trying to cause an uproar, and therefore not a serious journalist.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Did you watch much American -- either cable or broadcast television news -- leading up to the war? And what is your evaluation of the television news in the United States? And their performance leading up to the war in Iraq?
BORGER: Well, in terms of broadcast, cable or network news, there was a collective abandonment of journalistic objectivity in the run-up to the war. It was a collective act of jingoism, in the run-up to the war. No sense that -- Or no question about what side the journalists were on, and what side their reporting would support. And so any sense of questioning either motives for the war, or the way the war was being pursued -- with regard to fairness or collateral damage, and the killing of civilians -- all that went by the wayside. That was most true, obviously, on Fox TV. But it was also true on the more moderate networks.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: In my film, I'm looking at leading up to the war -- starting from August '02 to March '03. So I think some of those comments you were talking about were from during the war. But during the buildup to the war -- Did you kind of get a sense of a drumbeat? Or what were some of your evaluations of the -- leading up to the actual military intervention?
BORGER: Well, I found it striking how little questioning there was of the motives and of the evidence and the justifications for war. In a media that is, by its nature, sensational and headline-grabbing, there was the same reluctance to actually go for the jugular and say, "Well, tonight we look at whether there is any justification for this war," which in any other circumstances you might think would be a very attention-grabbing headline. But it was felt to be too dangerous -- And again, here -- This is an aspect in which September 11th has had a very powerful impact. There's a sense of "Are you being unpatriotic? Are you letting down the victims of 9/11?" And it carried through very much to the benefit of the Administration to the pre-Iraq period.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Okay. And on issues of international law, it seems like both the government and the mainstream media here doesn't really even give any sort of legitimacy towards international law. So could you speak towards how the United Kingdom or other countries in Europe view international law versus the United States?
BORGER: That's one difference in the -- There's one difference in the media coverage -- that the actions of the government with relation to international law are very much at the center of reporting -- certainly in Britain -- also in Europe. And they're just not at the center in the US. I think, maybe, this is a success of the American Right, to have pushed the sense -- these whole -- these questions of international legitimacy and international law to the side as a diversion -- As all part of the UN circus, and not something that directly concerns the US. And buying into this assumption that anything the US does as a "good nation" must therefore inherently be "good." There was a buying in to that notion, and that quiet assumption that underlay the level of the reporting.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: And how do other nations view the United States, in regards to international law?
BORGER: Well, it is one of those cases where the actions reinforce the stereotype in the minds of Europeans that's already there. There is this tendency from the word "go" to see America as a bully, because it is a much more successful, powerful country in the world. And when you had a string of actions by the Bush Administration when it first came in -- dumping Kyoto and the International Criminal Court -- then there was a growing predisposition to see the US in this bully role. And then it fulfilled that expectation -- fulfilled that stereotype many times over. And now it has very much hardened in the minds of Europeans and the rest of the world that this is a bully nation, which has little regard for the views of other nations except when they are particularly useful.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: During the buildup to the war, in late January, there was a shift in the Bush Administration -- to pursue a second resolution. Can you speak to why -- the influence of Blair on this particular decision, and why that happened?
BORGER: There were two things that Tony Blair really wanted in return for his support for going to war in Iraq. One was some action on the Israel-Palestinian conflict -- some sense of re-engagement by the Bush Administration. And the other was to go through the UN route. -- And to seek not just one, but ultimately a second resolution that would harden and strengthen the sense of international legitimacy behind an invasion. And Blair didn't get one of those -- Be didn't get any real engagement in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, but he did get a decision from George Bush -- overriding -- in a rare example, overriding Vice President Dick Cheney -- siding with Powell and Blair and going the UN route. And so it was primarily a favor to Tony Blair. But also, I think the Administration realized that it was necessary if there was any hope of amassing a broader coalition. In the end, it didn't work out.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: In speaking to how the media in the United States covered this issue of a second resolution -- It seemed like they said, "It's a political issue in the United Kingdom." But that's where it stopped. Can you speak to how that whole development was covered in the mainstream press here?
BORGER: Well, I think there was a sense in which it was seen as all part of the --
ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: I'm sorry, what was the --?
BORGER: Oh, yeah. I think there was a sense in which the haggling over a second resolution was all seen as part of the politicking that goes on in the corridors of the UN. It was power plays by the French and Russians, primarily the French. And it was seen as a stage in which the French were trying to limit American power in the world. That it wasn't about Iraq, it wasn't about weapons of mass destruction. This was really about two nations -- one of the New World, one of the Old World -- that had seen its power diminish over time, and was making a desperate bid to re-assert itself on the world stage. So it was very much seen in those political terms, which diverted attention from what was at the heart of the issue -- "Was there any evidence of WMD?" -- "Were the inspectors able to uncover WMD if given the time?" -- Those took almost second place behind the focus on the politicking that went on.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: From your sense -- I don't know -- did you -- if you read through the Butler Report, and also the issues of Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General -- Do you feel that his original advice -- did he give private advice saying that the war would be illegal? And then did he switch it at the end? Or what is your read on that?
BORGER: Oh, I'm not the best person to do the Goldsmith thing. Because I haven't looked at Butler or Goldsmith.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Okay. That's fine. From your sense, was this -- Did they have international legitimacy to go to war without that resolution? Was this war legal, in other words?
BORGER: Not -- Certainly not -- The war definitely wasn't legal in British eyes. And that's one of the outcomes of the Butler Report, is that there wasn't sufficient evidence to prove that Iraq had violated Resolution 1441 -- which, for the British at least, was the foundation for the war. So there are in Britain very profound questions of the international legitimacy of the war.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: And talk to -- It seems that Tony Blair was receiving a lot more flak from the public and from the government, from what happened after -- Where in the United States there was virtual silence compared to what was going on in Britain. Can you speak to what was going on after the war with Tony Blair? Why was everyone so upset?
BORGER: I think Tony Blair's problem was that there was a predisposition to be cynical about his reasons for going to war. There was already a sense that, "We're going for war on very shaky grounds indeed." And so once the weapons of mass destruction weren't found, then he was in a much more vulnerable position than Bush, who has a core constituency who will support him no matter what. He can fall back on 40 percent of the vote, even if it was proved that he made up all the reasons for going to war on a scrap of paper in the Oval Office. There is that ideological support that he can rely on that Tony Blair can't. Because Tony Blair -- in following George Bush into a war -- turned against the traditions of his own Party, which are inherently skeptical, suspicious of the US, and of the projection of power abroad -- particularly at the shoulder of the US. And so he was really taking on his own Party, and for that reason he didn't have this ideological bedrock of support that he could depend on when things got tough.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: From your sense -- Why did the United States and the United Kingdom go to war in Iraq? What are the motivations, from your reading of what happened?
BORGER: I think the causes of the war are fairly complex, and they're different in Britain from the US. I think in the US, you had a very strong, ideological constituency that came on board with George Bush in 2001 that were determined to go to war in Iraq -- Because they saw it as unfinished business from the first Gulf War. And they'd been pushing it -- [Interruption] -- Sorry I'll start again... -- I think the causes of the war are very different in the US and in Britain. In the US, you had an ideological constituency that came to power with George Bush in 2001that was determined to take on Saddam Hussein -- and to topple Saddam Hussein. It was all about unfinished business from the first Gulf War. This sense -- that he was a primary threat to the US -- in the oil-producing Gulf region, primarily -- But also, ultimately, to US power -- to US interests elsewhere. And that came together after 9-11 with the views of George Bush and Dick Cheney. The sense that they had been attacked once. They were responsible for having allowed that attack to happen, and were determined to strike out -- not just at the immediate foe, but any potential future foe -- and to strike back hard before they were struck again. And there was this sense that "We have to get them before they get us." And that coincided with a strong constituency within the Administration that was saying continually into George Bush's ear, "Iraq is the big problem." And so when those two came together, it produced an irresistible force to go into Iraq. So September 11th really accelerated that movement. I don't think they would have gone into Iraq in the first -- at least in the first term -- if it hadn't been for 9/11. I may be wrong about that, and we'll never know. But I don't think the neo-cons and the Iraq revanchists would necessarily have had enough power inside the Administration to take the US into the same scale of war as it did in 2003.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: As the Washington Bureau Chief here -- Are you covering the White House, State Department and Pentagon and everything on your own? Or what beats are you covering here?
BORGER: We have five correspondents in the US. We all -- pretty much all cover everything. The two correspondents here in Washington tend to cover the government, particularly since 9-11, when the rest of the world was obviously riveted on the next decision being made by the Bush Administration. And so it's become very much a question of just covering this Administration from the point of view of military intelligence / foreign policy -- that has become the focus for all Washington correspondents.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: [Interruption]... Why do you think that the -- well -- I'm trying to remember what --
BORGER: I did not answer half the question of -- "Why did they go to war?" And I did not answer why --
ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Oh, right. Why did you think -- Or what do you think were the interests in the United Kingdom? And why did Tony Blair seem to be so dedicated to this policy?
BORGER: I think there are two elements in Tony Blair's thinking. First of all, he was a convert to the belief that Iraq had serious WMD. From early on -- from the first coming to office, he got briefings that made his hair stand on end, and it became a primary concern. Secondly, he made a strategic decision that it is in British interests to stick with the US even when Britain doesn't agree in the direction the US is going. Because that is Britain's power in the world -- to be this bridge between Europe and the US. He also argued that it was better that we go in with the US, and have an influence -- Than the US go in alone, and be this rogue superpower on whom no one has an influence. So there was that consideration as well. It's all -- this obsession in Britain -- about punching above our weight in the world, and being more influential than we ought to be as a small, medium-power island.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Do you see that the nature of the competition within the newspapers in the United Kingdom is more rigorous, and that gives more aggressive reporting versus the reduced ownership here in the United States?
BORGER: I think all the local monopolies enjoyed by the main American papers has got to have a dampening effect on the aggressiveness of the reporting. But I think you can overdo that -- I mean, they are all competing against each other. The LA Times is competing with the New York Times is competing with the Washington Post -- when it comes to national stories. I think that applies more to local stories. On national stories, the competition is there. But given that competition, they're all worried about being frozen out by the Administration. No correspondent wants to be frozen out -- so he's not being briefed while his colleagues from the New York Times and the Washington Post are getting the briefings -- and he's left locked outside the door. I think that is the chilling fear that has knotted the spines of a lot of American journalists -- of being locked out. And I think that's a very powerful tool the Administration can use, and has used.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Okay. There seems to be a difference between the debates within the Parliament in the United Kingdom versus the debates here in Congress -- They were a lot more subdued here, and not more lively -- Can you talk to the cultural differences within Britain for engaging in debate? And the nature here in the United States with public relations --?
BORGER: Again, I think it's a question of -- This is a question of political institutions. In America, the head of state and the head of government is one person -- it's the President. In Britain, the head of government is a civilian -- He's not the head of state. He doesn't embody the nation. He's just another politician, and so he's answerable every week before Parliament -- has to go to "Question Time" and be grilled. And that is a difference with America where it is beneath the dignity of the head of state -- the President -- to be grilled in such an undignified manner in Congress. So he doesn't have to face that. And without that -- Without that collision of executive and legislative, you don't have -- the sparks don't fly. It's a relatively dull matter in Congress, because there are no real -- there are not the same "stinks". The President isn't there answering questions. Isn't there confronting angry Senators or Congressmen. And so it's a very fundamental difference in the way the two political systems are ordered. And that has another effect as well -- The President of the United States embodies the nation in a way the Prime Minister in Britain doesn't. The Prime Minister is just doing a job. When Americans choose a President, they're choosing someone who they want to embody them. And there is a reluctance, for that reason, to believe that the President is involved in cheap political games when it comes to foreign policy and sending the military abroad. There is a longing to believe that the President is acting on the noblest of intentions, and embodying America abroad. And so there is a reluctance to question the President in the same way that the Prime Minister is constantly exposed to doubt and cynicism in Britain.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: In leading up to the war, there was -- You mentioned that Tony Blair had some influence to going to the UN at all. And from the American press, it only seems like the sole factor was Colin Powell. From your sense, what influence did Tony Blair have on Bush to go to the UN in the first place?
BORGER: In a way, it's impossible to tell. Colin -- It's impossible to tell who had the most influence as Colin Powell and Tony Blair's pressures coincided -- converged -- and the end result was that the Administration took the UN route. It's impossible to take those apart and say that "If it hadn't been for Blair, would Powell alone have prevailed?" I think it's pretty clear that without Powell in the Administration, Blair would not have prevailed. But Blair did have significant influence. Because without Britain going in on the side of the Administration on the side of the US into this war -- it would have looked very much more like a unilateral action without world support. There is something iconic -- totemic -- about having British troops in there for the American people. American people feel, "Well, if Britain's with us, at least some of the world is with us." Without the old ally being by the side of American troops, it would have been a much harder sell for this Administration. And the consequences would have been much worse for the Bush Administration if it had gone in without British support.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Can you talk to what exactly Tony Blair promised the Parliament? Did he promise for a second resolution? Or what -- Talk about -- When they say it was a political decision in the United Kingdom -- just kind of elaborate on what exactly Tony had said to the Parliament.
BORGER: I can't remember what was said at what Cabinet meeting, and so on. So I'm shakier on that, because it hasn't been my patch -- on what the deal was with Cabinet and Parliament. I don't have those -- the memory of the sequence of events in my mind.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Do you have any sense of why Clare Short or Robin Cooke, why they -- Can you talk about them, and why they ended up resigning?
BORGER: Robin Cooke resigned on principle. He didn't think that the war was legal. He didn't think there was justification for going to war, and so he resigned out ahead of the war. Clare Short was persuaded to stay on -- on the grounds that once the war took place, there would be a very serious rebuilding -- a UN rebuilding -- effort. And it was only when it was clear that -- actually that wasn't going to happen -- that the US was very much running the post-war scenario as well -- that she was finally -- she finally decided to resign. By the time she had, of course, she'd lost a lot of her credibility. She hadn't resigned ahead of the war. She looked like she'd prevaricated and vacillated., and so it had much less of an effect than Robin Cook's departure.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Okay. And what is the sense of what people within the United Kingdom -- How do they view the United States now after this intervention?
BORGER: There's a great deal of distrust of the US now. I think there's a lot of focus on this election, because there is a sense in Britain that there was something very dodgy about the 2000 elections. And it may be that President Bush and this Administration has gone way off to the right, and doesn't represent the country. Now, what happens in November will be very important in terms of how Britain, and the rest of Europe, and the rest of the world views America. Because will they see the Bush Administration as embodying the American people? And if, of course, he wins and gets a mandate, then it'll be seen, "Well, this is really the will of the American people -- the pre-emptive foreign policy and all that -- this is what Americans want." There is a sense in which the jury is out about what the role and the views of the American people are in all this, because of the nature of the 2000 election.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: The BBC -- Can you talk about the structural differences between the BBC versus the news system here? In other words, the government subsidies and how that, from your perspective, influences the coverage -- or makes it better or worse?
BORGER: Well, the BBC operates on a charter, and that insulates them to a great degree from direct government influence. They're not dependent on a year-to-year grant, and so that gives a sense of much greater -- Sorry, I'll start again. Well, the BBC operates on a charter, which gives them a much greater sense of independence. They're not dependent on getting subsidies -- hand-to-mouth each year, each month -- and so that gives them a certain distance from the government. And they're much more likely to go after the government -- to be critical of the government -- than their equivalents here, who don't have that same sense of independence.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: Now -- What is your reading on the Andrew Gilligan case? Was that really a case of malfeasance? Or was there actually legitimate concerns about this 45-minute weapons claim? It's since come out, but not really come out here in the American press as much --
BORGER: I think the BBC and Andrew Gilligan were very unfortunate. They got the big story right, that there was pressure to "sex up the dossier". Unfortunately, the methods and some of the details were wrong, and so they were very vulnerable to attack. BBC made a big mistake not ‘fessing up to those mistakes very early on and saying, "Yeah, okay. These were some mistakes, but broadly speaking, we stick with the story. And we have a lot of evidence to prove that this evidence is being hyped-up." And that -- Turning it into a show of strength between -- or a battle of strength between the BBC and the government -- was a mistake, because the BBC was vulnerable on the details. In the big picture, it was actually -- it turned out to be right.

Track 10:
ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: And so from your sense -- I think a lot of the American press is trying to pin all of the blame on the Central Intelligence Agency -- What is your take? Do you see that it was just the CIA -- bad intelligence -- or does that make sense?
BORGER: Obviously, it wasn't just the CIA. I don't necessarily believe that that's the way the American press is portraying it. I think there is an awareness in the reporting that you see among the American press, that there was a very deliberate avoidance of dealing with the Administration. And it was being -- The whole consideration of the Administration's role was put off until a phase two -- sometime in the future. So there was an awareness that not all the story has been told. And it's quite clear that there was an environment in which CIA analysts believed that certain sorts of reports would be well received, and would be good for their career. And certain other reports would be sent back, questioned, and wouldn't be good for their career. And there has been a reluctance by the investigations on both sides of the Atlantic to look into the role of that mechanism, because it is a political mechanism -- No one asked anyone specifically to lie, as far as anyone knows, it was just an atmosphere and an environment -- but it was, nevertheless, very real.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: And do you also -- Did you do some -- You did some reporting on Office of Special Plans, right?
BORGER: [Yes]
ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: And what did you see was the influence of this alternative intelligence unit?
BORGER: The role of the Office of Special Plans -- and before that, the intelligence cell within Doug Feith's office -- came up early on. It came up in 2002, because CIA officials were getting really annoyed that there was this parallel route for intelligence to pass through to get to the White House. There was a great deal of annoyance, and there was a great deal of frustration that the analysts were coming under pressure. And there was such a buildup of annoyance that it was coming out -- people were talking about it. And again, the people on the fringes of the intelligence world -- the former officials who were still in touch with their colleagues -- were raising the alarm about this. And all this was out there in 2002 -- very much real, on the radar. And that is a remarkable thing -- that there was so little reporting of it in the US press -- because it was definitely out there. Knight-Ridder and New Yorker -- again, the exceptions to the rule.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: And do you see editorially that the New York Times -- Do you see a pattern that they were playing the sensational claims on the front page and them burying them, and then, -- As it was even -- running up to the war? You know, in hindsight, you can see that, but -- What was your perspective during the buildup when you were reading the New York Times or the Washington Post?
BORGER: I think the patterns become clear afterwards. I mean, it would be very easy to say, "Yes, I saw a pattern all the way along. Information was being manipulated." But it just shows how insidious it is that these -- certain reports are put on the outside, others on the inside. And that when you look back on it by looking at databases, it looks like they've been given almost equal weight. But in fact, some were being projected and some were being buried -- and it had a very insidious effect on public opinion, and on sort of the conventional wisdom inside the Beltway.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: One question I've been asking a lot of people is -- From this point on, do you have a vision of what it's going to take for world peace? Do you have a vision of where we're at now, and what needs to happen, from both within this government and all governments around the world -- to kind of get to where it's a little bit more rational with our relations with each other?
BORGER: I suppose what it takes is an awareness of interconnectedness on the part of populations. A sense that -- In the modern world, all countries are interconnected, interdependent -- and cannot act unilaterally without severe repercussions down the road. And I think it is dangerous -- that there is a significant part of the American population that believes that America can do what it likes. And because they inherently see America as a good country and they see themselves as good people, that ultimately the rest of the world will fall into line and recognize that. And I think that's a dangerous thing. And I think only when an awareness grows up that there are repercussions for acting unilaterally -- and acting solely in short-term national interest -- then you can begin to see a political shift.

ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: And did you see that there was a clear lack of questioning of this pre-emptive policy during this critical time period? Was there a lot more questioning in the British press versus what you saw here in the United States' press?
BORGER: Yes, there was very much more questioning in the British press. There was an inherent --
ECHO CHAMBER PROJECT: I'm sorry -- Of what?
BORGER: Oh, yeah. There was much more questioning about the idea of a pre-emptive military and foreign policy in the British press than the American press -- and among the British people and the American people -- Of course, we're a small power and America is a great super-power. And of course, America had been through 9/11, and that had an enormous difference -- It had enormous impact on the mindsets of the population, the elites, the media -- the sense that this country was suddenly vulnerable -- in a way that other countries had always been vulnerable. But that sense of American exceptionalism and invulnerability had been punctured, and it had a great impact on the way people looked on the world. And there was a great sense of consensus, "We must go after them first, and get them first." -- And a growing impatience with the limits on action -- the international limits on action -- the need for consensus with other countries. And it was a terrible waste, because there was a great upswell of support for the US and US foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11. That was -- There was offers of help, and offers of international cooperation to deal with terrorism, and the traffic in WMD, and it was wasted over Iraq.